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Abstract.  Rights holders have been successful in every major copyright action 
brought against peer-to-peer (P2P) software providers.  By 2005, those behind 
Napster, Aimster, Grokster, Morpheus and Kazaa have each been held liable for 
their users‟ infringements and effectively exited the market.  But those successes 
did not result in any reduction in the availability of P2P file sharing software.  In 
fact, the opposite occurred:  soon after the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of 
rights holders in Grokster, there was exponential growth in the number of P2P file 
sharing applications available.  This Article argues that this came about because 
the pre-P2P and current U.S. secondary liability laws were and are based on a 
number of physical world assumptions that are simply not tenable in the software 
context.  After identifying those assumptions, and contrasting them with the 
relevant software world realities, the Article demonstrates that the explosion in the 
number and availability of P2P apps can be traced directly to the Supreme Court‟s 
failure to recognize the mismatch between the two paradigms. 
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INTRODUCTION:  A UNIQUE VULNERABILITY TO 
ANTIREGULATORY CODE 
When the advent of P2P file sharing technologies in the late 1990s brought 
about a torrent of infringement, rights holders responded in the same way they 
always had:  by targeting the intermediaries that provided the infringement-
enabling technologies.1  Suing gatekeepers has long been the orthodox legal 
response in situations where enforcement against individuals will predictably be 
ineffective, and this was a textbook example.2  The number of participating 
infringers was so high, pursuing them so costly, and the chances of their being 
apprehended so remote, that the threat of direct infringement—even with the 
possibility of astronomical penalties—left individual infringers largely unmoved.3 
As Professor Tim Wu has pointed out, until recently, copyright law was 
―entirely dependent on gatekeeper enforcement‖—the gatekeepers being the 
publishers, manufacturers and others that were ―capable of copying and distributing 
works on a mass scale.‖4  Traditionally, rights holders had considerable success in 
using legal doctrines based on these principles of gatekeeper enforcement to shut 
down activities that facilitated copyright infringement.5  Such activities ranged 
from swap meets whose proprietors tacitly permitted vendors to sell infringing 
records, to dance halls whose operators failed to secure licenses allowing visiting 
bands to perform copyrighted music, to advertising agencies that created campaigns 
for purveyors of ―suspiciously‖ cheap records.6  Such enforcement efforts were also 
 
 1. Regarding this history of pursuing intermediaries for third party infringement, see, e.g., Sony 
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984); Recording Indus. Ass‘n of Am. v. 
Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999).  See also Univ. of New South Wales v 
Moorhouse [1975] 133 CLR 1 (Austl.); CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Soc‘y of Upper Canada, [2004] 
S.C.R. 339 (Can.); CBS Songs Ltd. v. Amstrad Consumer Electronics Plc. [1988] A.C. 1013 (H.L.) 
(U.K.). 
 2. See Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers:  The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement 
Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 56–57 (1986).  For an excellent discussion of the theory behind 
indirect liability from an economist‘s perspective, see also Doug Lichtman & Eric Posner, Holding 
Internet Service Providers Accountable, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 221 (2006). 
 3. See David Lindsay, Internet Intermediary Liability:  A Comparative Analysis in the Context 
of the Digital Agenda Reforms, (24)1&2 COPYRIGHT REP. 70, 73 (2006) (―As pursuing individual 
infringers is costly, questions ar[i]se regarding the liability of intermediaries that are not involved with 
the publication of material, but that participate in the communication, location or storage of material.‖); 
Jacqueline D. Lipton, Solving the Digital Piracy Puzzle: Disaggregating Fair Use from the DMCA‟s 
Anti-Device Provisions, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 111, 156 (2005) (arguing that rights holders pursue 
secondary infringers ―[b]ecause of the economic reality of pursuing direct infringers‖); Alfred C. Yen, 
Third-Party Copyright Liability After Grokster, 91 MINN. L. REV. 184, 186 (2006–2007) (―The normal 
remedy for copyright infringement is litigation against infringers.  However, the number of computer-
based infringers is so large that copyright holders cannot find and sue them all.‖). 
 4. Tim Wu, When Code Isn‟t Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 712 (2003). 
 5. See, e.g., Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996); Dreamland Ball 
Room v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1929); Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. 
Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). 
 6. See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d 259; Dreamland Ball Room, 36 F.2d 354; Screen Gems-Columbia 
Music, 256 F. Supp. 399. 
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successful in deterring many future market entrants from engaging in the kind of 
conduct that had previously resulted in liability, and thus further limiting eventual 
third party infringement.7  When they commenced their ten-year struggle to apply 
the same principles to P2P software providers, rights holders undoubtedly expected 
to achieve the same outcome.  But things did not go according to plan.  Although 
they prevailed in every major court action instituted against P2P providers, 
software developers remained unfazed.  By 2007, more software programs 
facilitating P2P file sharing were available than ever before.8  The average number 
of users sharing files on P2P file sharing networks at any one time was nudging 10 
million, and it was estimated that P2P traffic had grown to comprise up to ninety 
percent of all global Internet traffic.9  At that point, rights holders tacitly admitted 
defeat.  Abandoning their long-held strategy of suing key P2P software providers, 
they closed the P2P software litigation chapter and diverted enforcement resources 
to other areas, particularly global efforts to persuade or compel Internet service 
providers to police infringing users.10 
To understand why those lengthy, expensive and ultimately successful efforts to 
shut down individual P2P file sharing technologies had little or no impact on the 
availability of file sharing software, it is necessary to understand something about 
the unique properties of software code.  For many years now it has been recognized 
that code can have regulatory effects—or, as Professor Lawrence Lessig famously 
put it, ―code is law.‖11  As he explains, ―[t]he software and hardware that make 
 
 7. See Thomas Hays, The Evolution and Decentralisation of Secondary Liability for 
Infringements of Copyright-Protected Works:  Part 1, 28(12) EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 617, 617 (2006) 
(describing the way in which predigital era ―[s]econdary infringements . . . were, for the most part, 
crude, marginal transactions, the subjects of swap meets and unlicensed kiosks‖). 
 8. There are no reliable statistics regarding the number of applications available from Napster 
onwards, but the post-Grokster upward trajectory in the number of P2P applications under development 
is evidenced by data from the SourceForge open source software repository at different points in time.  
On October 24th, 2007, a little more than two years after the Grokster decision was handed down, the 
site hosted some 2,180 projects in its ―file sharing‖ category.  By December 23rd of the following year, 
that number grew to 3,502.  SOURCEFORGE, http://www.sourceforge.net (last visited Nov. 7, 2011). 
 9. See Eric Bangeman, P2P Traffic Shifts Away from Music, Towards Movies, ARS TECHNICA 
(July 6, 2007), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2007/07/p2p-traffic-shifts-away-from-music-
towards-movies.ars [hereinafter Bangeman, P2P Traffic Shifts Away from Music].  See also Eric 
Bangeman, P2P Responsible for as Much as 90 Percent of All „Net Traffic, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 3, 
2007), http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2007/09/p2p-responsible-for-as-much-as-90-percent-of-all-
net-traffic.ars. 
 10. See Alain Strowel, The „Graduated Response‟ in France:  Is It the Good Reply to Online 
Copyright Infringements?, in COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT AND THE INTERNET 147 (Irini A. Stamatoudi 
ed., 2010); Peter K. Yu, The Graduated Response, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1373 (2010); Jeremy de Beer & 
Christopher D. Clemmer, Global Trends in Online Copyright Enforcement:  A Non-Neutral Role for 
Network Intermediaries?, 49 JURIMETRICS J. 375 (2009) (giving a detailed analysis of this trend across a 
variety of jurisdictions). 
 11. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (1999).  Those famous words 
were first enunciated by architecture and media professor William J. Mitchell, who, in the context of 
explaining the significance of cyberspace, wrote that ―[o]ut there on the electronic frontier, code is the 
law.‖  WILLIAM J. MITCHELL, CITY OF BITS:  SPACE, PLACE, AND THE INFOBAHN 111 (1995).  For more 
on this idea that code regulates, see James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace:  Surveillance, Sovereignty, 
and Hardwired Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 177, 201 (1997) (predicting—two years before Napster was 
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cyberspace what it is constitute a set of constraints on how you can behave.‖12  For 
example, software code may regulate behavior by imposing a password 
requirement on users seeking to gain access to a particular service.13  Historically, 
rights holders have used a variety of code-based measures as part of their efforts to 
promote compliance among end users, with the most notable example being Sony‘s 
disastrous rootkit experiment.14  In the P2P file sharing context, however, the idea 
that code regulates is less significant than the separate but related idea that code can 
be antiregulatory in effect.  As Wu explains, ―the reason [why] code matters for law 
at all is its capability to define behavior on a mass scale.  This capability can mean 
constraints on behavior, in which case code regulates, but it can also mean shaping 
behavior into legally advantageous forms.‖15  Wu analogizes such antiregulatory 
programmers to tax lawyers.  ―[They look] for loopholes or ambiguities in the 
operation of law (or, sometimes, ethics).  More precisely, [they look] for places 
where the stated goals of the law are different than its self-defined or practical 
limits.  The designer then redesigns behavior to exploit the legal weakness.‖16 
As will become clear, post-Napster P2P developers engaged in precisely this 
kind of behavior, routinely seeking to code their software in ways that sidestepped 
the limits of the existing law whilst nonetheless facilitating vast amounts of 
infringement.17  Those behind the Grokster and Morpheus file sharing applications 
were so successful in coding their way around the existing law that the U.S. 
Supreme Court had to recognize a new theory of liability to defeat them.18  Such 
technologies highlighted the copyright law‘s peculiar vulnerability to attack by 
antiregulatory code.  However, the reasons for that vulnerability remain largely 
unexplored.  The best effort to do so comes from Wu‘s groundbreaking article 
 
developed—that ―there will be a continuing technological struggle between content providers, their 
customers, their competitors, and future creators‖); M. Ethan Katsh, Software Worlds and the First 
Amendment:  Virtual Doorkeepers in Cyberspace, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 335, 335–43 (1996) (exploring the 
role of software in structuring the online environment); Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Shaping Code, 18 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 319, 320 (2005) (canvassing a number of different ways in which code can be and 
is in fact used to regulate behavior); Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 
EMORY L.J. 869, 896–97 (1996) (exploring the idea that software can constrain or ―regulate‖ behavior) 
[hereinafter Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace]; Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica:  The 
Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 568–74 (1998) 
(arguing that technology is a source of rulemaking separate from traditional law, and analogizing 
features of the ―lex informatica‖ to traditional legal regulation); R. Polk Wagner, On Software 
Regulation, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 457 (2005) (elaborating on the code/law relationship, particularly the 
substitutability of code and law). 
 12. LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE, supra note 11, at 89. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See, e.g., Robert McMillan, Sony Rootkit Settlement with States Reaches $5.75M, 
INFOWORLD (Dec. 21, 2006), http://www.infoworld.com/d/security-central/sony-rootkit-settlement-
states-reaches-575m-558. 
 15. Wu, When Code Isn‟t Law, supra note 4, at 707–08. 
 16. Id. at 708. 
 17. See infra pp. 78–95. 
 18. There is some controversy as to whether that theory was in fact new, or simply an addition to 
an existing theory.  See Rebecca Giblin, Code Wars:  10 Years of P2P Software Litigation 89–91 (Dec. 
31, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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When Code Isn‟t Law, in which he identifies two bases for it.19  The first is the 
law‘s longstanding reliance on gatekeeper enforcement mechanisms, mentioned 
above.20  Gatekeeper enforcement schemes are premised on the idea that relatively 
few people are capable of widespread copying and distribution.21  Thus, as Wu 
explains, they ―have an obvious weakness:  [t]hey depend on a specialized good or 
service remaining specialized.‖22  P2P file sharing technologies subvert that 
assumption by placing the ability to efficiently and cheaply distribute books, 
movies, music and other content in the hands of individual consumers.  The second 
reason is the dearth of normative support for the law from individual users.23  Wu‘s 
reasoning on this point is based on empirical studies that suggest that individual 
end users have a widely held belief that copying copyrighted material for a friend is 
acceptable, whereas selling it on a commercial basis is not.24  Wu argues that P2P 
file sharing applications ―brilliantly‖ exploit this distinction between commercial 
and noncommercial copying: 
P2P clients create no sensation or impression of stealing . . . . Instead, the user is 
invited to a ―community‖ of peers who exchange song files.  A user, importantly, has 
no sense that she is ―selling‖ copyrighted materials.  The design therefore exploits the 
distinction between the acceptance of noncommercial copying and the nonacceptance 
of commercial copying.  While the economic consequences of peer filesharing could 
be large, the superficial absence of commercial exchange makes filesharing more 
acceptable under the norms of home copying.25 
Thus, by eliminating gatekeepers, and by exploiting the fact that many 
individuals do not have any ethical problem with ―sharing‖ content with others 
online, Wu argued that P2P software providers have sometimes managed to avoid 
the law‘s traditional enforcement measures.26 
This Article posits that there is also a third reason for that vulnerability:  one that 
explains not only why the pre-P2P secondary liability law proved so peculiarly 
unsuited to the task of dealing with purveyors of antiregulatory code but also why 
even successful litigation against P2P software providers failed to curb its spread.  
It is premised on the idea that software is radically and fundamentally different 
from physical world technologies.  The U.S. pre-P2P secondary liability law 
evolved from decades of decisions relating almost exclusively to physical world 
scenarios and technologies.27  Necessarily, the resulting principles were based on 
 
 19. Wu, When Code Isn‟t Law, supra note 4. 
 20. Id. at 683. 
 21. Id. at 683, 685. 
 22. Id. at 716. 
 23. Id. at 683. 
 24. Id. at 724. 
 25. Id. at 724–25. 
 26. Id. at 685, 716–17, 722–26. 
 27. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); Kalem Co. 
v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911); Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996); 
Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt. Inc., 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971); Shapiro, Bernstein 
& Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963); RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d 
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certain assumptions that had long proved correct in the physical world paradigm.  
But there is a gap between those physical world assumptions and the realities of 
P2P software development, which this Article dubs the physical world/software 
world divide.  With reference to it, this Article presents a new theory that explains 
why, despite being ultimately successful in holding individual P2P software 
providers liable for their users‘ infringement, the litigation strategy failed to bring 
about any meaningful reduction in the amount of P2P development and 
infringement. 
It will do so over the following four parts.  Part I begins by identifying four 
physical world assumptions on which pre-P2P secondary liability law was 
implicitly based.  Part II introduces the secondary liability law, and highlights the 
ways in which secondary liability law manifests those assumptions.  Part III 
outlines the way in which the law evolved as it was applied to P2P software 
providers.  Finally, Part IV demonstrates that the subsequent explosive growth in 
the number and variety of P2P software applications available was a direct 
consequence of the secondary liability law‘s failure to recognize its own underlying 
physical world assumptions, and the ways in which software world realities depart 
from them. 
I.  PHYSICAL WORLD ASSUMPTIONS 
Since the theory underlying this Article focuses its inquiry on the characteristics 
of software code that make software code different and unique as compared to 
physical world equivalents, it is necessary to conceptually separate software from 
hardware.  Software refers to the ―programs and other operating information used 
by a computer,‖ while hardware is the physical equipment necessary to execute 
software‘s commands.28  The definition of ―code‖ adopted in the existing legal 
literature typically conflates the two by defining ―code‖ as the ―information 
technology architecture,‖ or ―the hardware and software,‖ that constitutes a 
particular technology.29  It is easy for these lines to become blurred, since software 
is increasingly incorporated into much of the hardware we use in day to day life 
(including our MP3 players, personal video recorders, cars, microwave ovens and 
more).  However, it is necessary to separate them in this context, since the equation 
of hardware and software risks masking the unique characteristics of software code 
on its own account, and particularly the ways in which it differs from the physical 
world technologies that came before it. 
 
Cir. 1940); Dreamland Ball Room v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1929); Polygram 
Int‘l Pub. Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314 (D. Mass. 1994); Harper v. Shoppel, 26 F. 519 
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886). 
 28. Software Definition, THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1612 (Erin McKean ed., 2d 
ed. 2005). 
 29. See, e.g., EGBERT DOMMERING & LODEWIJK ASSCHER, CODING REGULATION 2 (2006); 
LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE, supra note 11, at 6; Kesan & Shah, supra note 11, at 
320.  But cf. Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, supra note 11, at 896. 
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A.  EVERYBODY IS BOUND BY PHYSICAL WORLD RULES 
This first assumption that everyone is bound by the rules of the physical world 
underlies much of pre-P2P secondary liability law, and is the most abstract and 
poorly understood of the four.  Understanding it requires delving into some of the 
conceptual differences between software worlds and physical worlds.  Consider 
what we know about the physical space we occupy.  We have an immediate and 
intuitive understanding about how it works.30  ―Apples, when released fall down, 
not up.  Actions are causally related to consequences.  We expect things to behave 
sensibly.  Our intuitive notion of what is ‗sensible‘ is based on common-sense 
experiences, learned from earliest childhood, and rooted in the physical world.‖31  
As M. Ethan Katsh explains: 
In the ―real world,‖ time and space are ever-present constraints, with the laws of 
physics frequently limiting many of our desires to do something or be somewhere.  
The list of constraints to which we accommodate ourselves is significant.  We respect 
the laws of gravity.  We understand that no more than one object can occupy the same 
place.  We recognize that we can only be in one place at one time and that there are 
some places we cannot go to because there is not enough time or because they are too 
far away.32 
What is less well understood is that physical world rules do not necessarily 
apply to software.  In fact, neither the laws of physics nor any other law or 
principle known in the physical world has any application in the virtual context.33  
In the words of Professor Joseph Weizenbaum: 
There is a distinction between physically embodied machines, whose ultimate 
function is to transduce energy or deliver power, and abstract machines. i.e., [sic] 
machines that exist only as ideas.  The laws which the former embody must be a 
subset of the laws that govern the real world.  The laws that govern the behavior of 
abstract machines are not necessarily so constrained.  One may, for example, design 
an abstract machine whose internal signals are propagated among its components at 
speeds greater than the speed of light, in clear violation of physical law.34 
Unbound by physical world rules, software code is incredibly malleable.  
 
 30. Boris Beizer, Software is Different, in 10 ANNALS OF SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 293, 295 
(Dilip Patel & Yingxu Wang eds., 2000). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Katsh, supra note 11, at 341–42. 
 33. See JOSEPH WEIZENBAUM, COMPUTER POWER AND HUMAN REASON 111 (1976).  See also 
Beizer, supra note 30, at 296; Alan M. Davis, Fifteen Principles of Software Engineering, 111(6) IEEE 
SOFTWARE 94, 94 (1994); William Greubel, A Comedy of Errors:  Defining “Component” in a Global 
Information Technology Market—Accounting for Innovation by Penalizing the Innovators, 24 J. 
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 507 (2006); Juris Hartmanis, Turing Award Lecture:  On 
Computational Complexity and the Nature of Computer Science, 37(10) COMM. OF THE ACM 37, 39 
(1994); Katsh, supra note 11, at 341–42; Yingxu Wang, Keynote Lecture:  On the Informatics Laws of 
Software, PROC. OF THE FIRST IEEE INT‘L CONF. ON COGNITIVE INFORMATICS, 132 (regarding the idea 
that software is not bound by physical laws). 
 34. WEIZENBAUM, supra note 33, at 111. 
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Indeed, Professor James Moor identified ―logical malleability‖ as software code‘s 
revolutionary characteristic.35  The medium‘s inherent freedom and flexibility led 
Weizenbaum in 1976 to famously describe computer programmers as creators of 
―universes of virtually unlimited complexity.‖36  That unrestrained capability can, 
of course, be reined in by other code:  as Lessig explains, ―[d]ifferent code makes 
differently regulable networks.  Regulability is thus a function of design.‖37  
However, the Internet was deliberately designed to be as free and open as possible 
for future developers and, as a result, developers of Internet-based P2P file sharing 
programs face very few code-based constraints.38  All of this means that entities in 
a software world ―can be made . . . to overlap, interconnect, and interact in ways 
that are not possible or feasible in the physical world.‖39  Thus programmers can 
write software with functionality that is unrestrained by the physical world‘s 
limitations. 
Copyright law evolved in response to decades of litigation involving physical 
world scenarios and technologies.  The intuitive and unacknowledged 
understanding that we all have of the physical world‘s constraints has inevitably 
played a large role in informing the law‘s response to those scenarios.  There can be 
no doubt that judges must sometimes have been influenced by unspoken and 
unacknowledged assumptions that if certain things were infeasible, impossible or 
impractical in the physical world, they were infeasible, impossible or impractical 
full stop.  Since these assumptions held in the physical world context, the secondary 
liability law worked well for a long period of time, and secondary infringements 
were limited—being ―for the most part, crude, marginal transactions, the subjects 
of swap meets and unlicensed kiosks.‖40  But as the P2P software cases 
demonstrate over and over again, secondary liability principles based on the 
assumption that physical world rules apply can result in unanticipated outcomes 
when applied to situations where they simply do not.41  For example, a law that 
implicitly assumes that knowledge of a wrongdoing will be a natural corollary of a 
defendant‘s culpability may struggle to respond to a defendant that utilizes 
encryption software to eliminate such knowledge.  This might be the kind of 
 
 35. James H. Moor, What is Computer Ethics?,16(4) METAPHILOSOPHY 266, 269 (1985). 
 36. WEIZENBAUM, supra note 33, at 115. 
 37. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0 34 (2006). 
 38. See STUART BIEGEL, BEYOND OUR CONTROL?  CONFRONTING THE LIMITS OF OUR LEGAL 
SYSTEM IN THE AGE OF CYBERSPACE 187–211 (2001) (providing an analysis of the effects changes to 
the code or architecture of the Internet may have); STEVEN LEVY, HACKERS:  HEROES OF THE 
COMPUTER REVOLUTION 40–49 (1994) (providing further information on the philosophies of the 
Internet‘s creators); Lawrence B. Solum & Minn Chung, The Layers Principle:  Internet Architecture 
and the Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 815 (2004) (providing a detailed explanation of the way in which 
the Internet is coded, and why that structure allows free development of new protocols such as those 
needed for P2P file sharing); Barry M. Leiner et. al., A Brief History of the Internet, INTERNET SOCIETY, 
http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml (last visited Nov. 11, 2011) (providing a history of the 
way in which the Internet was developed). 
 39. Katsh, supra note 11, at 339. 
 40. Hays, supra note 7, at 617. 
 41. See infra pp. 78–95, 112–117. 
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phenomenon that Mitchell Kapor and John Perry Barlow were hinting at when they 
observed in 1990 that ―the old concepts of property, expression, identity, 
movement, and context, based as they are on physical manifestation, do not apply 
succinctly in a world where there can be none.‖42 
B.  DEVELOPING AND DISTRIBUTING DISTRIBUTION PRODUCTS IS EXPENSIVE 
The final three assumptions identified in this work are less abstract, and build 
upon one another.  The first relates to cost.  As Professor Jessica Litman has 
observed, ―[o]ur copyright law was designed in an era in which mass distribution of 
copies of works required a significant capital investment.‖43  There can be no doubt 
that the creation of physical world distribution technologies capable of vast 
amounts of infringement, such as printing presses, photocopiers, and VCRs, 
typically requires large investments in research, development and infrastructure.44  
Even if the initial invention of a physical world distribution technology is achieved 
cheaply—and history is filled with examples of hobbyist inventors on shoestring 
budgets making amazing breakthroughs—developing it for marketing, mass 
manufacturing, promotion and delivery all require considerable amounts of cash. 45 
The sizeable investment long inherent in the development, manufacture and 
delivery of physical distribution technologies created high barriers to market entry 
that limited the number of manufacturers to relatively few—something that has 
long made it easier for content owners to enforce their rights against secondary 
infringers.46  One of the reasons that the copyright law evolved to rely on 
gatekeeper enforcement measures, as outlined above, was because these factors 
prevented end users from participating in widespread dissemination of copyrighted 
works.  As Professor Jane Ginsburg explains: 
Copyright owners have traditionally avoided targeting end users of copyrighted 
works.  This is in part because pursuing the ultimate consumer is costly and 
unpopular.  But the primary reason has been because end users did not copy works of 
authorship—or if they did copy, the reproduction was insignificant and rarely the 
subject of widespread further dissemination.  Rather, the entities creating and 
disseminating copies (or public performances or displays) were intermediaries 
between the creators and the consumers:  for example, publishers, motion picture 
producers, and producers of phonograms.  Infringements, rather than being spread 
throughout the user population, were concentrated higher up the chain of distribution 
of works.  Pursuing the intermediary therefore offered the most effective way to 
enforce copyright interests.47 
 
 42. Mitchell Kapor & John Perry Barlow, Across the Electronic Frontier, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 
FOUNDATION (July 10, 1990), http://w2.eff.org/Misc/Publications/John_Perry_Barlow/HTML/eff.html. 
 43. Jessica Litman, The Copyright Revision Act of 2026, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 249, 
253 (2009). 
 44. Jonathan Zittrain, A History of Online Gatekeeping, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 253, 255 (2006). 
 45. See generally TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH (2011) (providing many such examples). 
 46. Zittrain, supra note 44, at 255. 
 47. Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the “Information Superhighway”:  Authors, Exploiters, 
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A further corollary to the large investment necessary to create such technologies 
is that their providers are likely to be easily identifiable and deep-pocketed, making 
them attractive defendants in the event they step out of line. 
C.  DISTRIBUTION TECHNOLOGIES ARE DEVELOPED FOR PROFIT 
The third physical world assumption is that distribution technologies are 
developed for profit.  As Professor Jonathan Zittrain has observed, ―[b]efore the 
advent of modems and networks, major physical-world infringers typically needed 
a business model because mass scale copyright infringements required substantial 
investment in copying and distribution infrastructure.‖48  Thus the assumption that 
developers of distribution technologies would do so for profit was inextricably tied 
to the large investments that were considered to be an integral part of developing 
and distributing it in the first place:  once that initial investment had been made, 
there was strong motivation to obtain some financial return.  This traditional need 
to make a massive investment and then to recoup those expenses has significant 
implications.  As Paul Ganley has explained: 
The normal phases of R&D, product design, manufacture, unit testing and distribution 
all help to constrain the wilder excesses of copyright infringing potential.  The 
inherent checks and balances in the structure of legitimate businesses help to ensure 
that companies will shy away from such costly and time consuming exercises if they 
believe there is no legitimate avenue for them to recoup their substantial 
investment.49 
This assumption was reflected in various theories of secondary liability for 
copyright infringement.  It is most explicit in the vicarious liability doctrine, of 
which one element is a ―direct financial interest‖ in the infringement.50  However, 
the imposition of contributory liability has also often appeared to be inspired 
largely by the profit motives of the defendants.51 
Once again, this assumption worked to keep the total number of providers 
relatively small.  It also probably helped to keep them in line.  Few providers were 
likely to skirt the edges of the law too closely, since litigation by aggrieved rights 
holders would cut dramatically into their anticipated profits. 
 
and Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1466, 1488 (1995). 
 48. Zittrain, supra note 44, at 255. 
 49. Paul Ganley, Surviving Grokster:  Innovation and the Future of Peer-to-Peer, 28(1) EUR. 
INTELL. PROP. REV. 15, 22 (2006). 
 50. Gershwin Publ‘g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971). 
 51. For example, in Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management Inc., the case in 
which the modern contributory infringement framework was developed, the Court‘s finding of liability 
seemed influenced by the fact that the defendant had significantly profited from the infringing concerts, 
although profit was not, strictly speaking, an element of the tort.  See 443 F.2d at 1162.  Similarly, in 
Fonovisa Inc., v. Cherry Auction Inc, it seems that the Court was influenced by the fact that Cherry 
Auction was profiting from the increased revenue that resulted from the infringement.  See Fonovisa, 
Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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D.  RATIONAL DEVELOPERS OF DISTRIBUTION TECHNOLOGIES WILL NOT 
SHARE THEIR SECRETS WITH THEIR CONSUMERS OR THEIR COMPETITORS 
The final relevant assumption is that providers of distribution technologies are 
unwilling to share the secrets of their inventions.  This follows closely from the 
assumption that distribution technologies are expensive to develop.  Having spent 
money to research, develop, manufacture and distribute a technology, the provider 
has no incentive to share that technology with its competitors.  This is another 
reason why the gatekeeper enforcement regime worked so well before software-
based distribution technologies emerged.  The disinclination to allow technologies 
to be copied helped further limit the number of technology providers, and enabled 
gatekeeper-based laws to effectively keep them under control. 
The following Part highlights the way in which these physical world 
assumptions manifest in the pre-P2P secondary liability law.  The subsequent 
sections then trace the ways in which the failure of courts to recognize these 
assumptions—and how software world realities could depart from them—led 
directly to an upsurge in the number of P2P file sharing applications under 
development. 
II.  THE PRE-P2P LAW 
The pre-P2P U.S. copyright law imposed secondary liability on a defendant in 
accordance with two common law doctrines—contributory and vicarious 
infringement.  Secondary liability can only accrue after some primary infringement 
has occurred.52  Though the two doctrines have historically sometimes been 
combined and confused, they are now accepted as being wholly independent.53  As 
will be seen, both doctrines evolved almost exclusively with reference to physical 
world technologies and scenarios. 
A.  VICARIOUS LIABILITY 
Vicarious liability for copyright infringement developed from respondeat 
superior, a legal doctrine concerned with the liability of employers for the torts of 
 
 52. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 929 (2005). 
 53. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 615 F. Supp. 838, 857 (S.D.N.Y. 
1985) (finding that vicarious liability is ―established if it is shown that a party, with knowledge of 
infringing activity, induces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another‖).  The 
definition applied in Universal City Studios actually refers to the separate doctrine of contributory 
infringement; in contrast, vicarious liability has no knowledge element.  See also Telerate Sys., Inc. v. 
Caro, 689 F. Supp. 221, 227–28, n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (suggesting that in ―the intellectual property 
context,‖ vicarious and contributory liability are interchangeable); Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, 
Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261–64 (9th Cir. 1996); Gershwin Publ‘g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 
F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).  A standard combining elements of both contributory and vicarious 
liability has been proposed and emphatically rejected.  See Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 690 F. Supp. 289, 
294 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).  But see, e.g., Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930 (demonstrating that the doctrines are now 
accepted as being independent). 
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their employees.54  Its roots lie in the tort theory of enterprise liability, which posits 
that enterprises should internalize losses that are caused by their existence as a cost 
of doing business, under the rationale that businesses that cause losses ought to be 
responsible for their rectification.55  This encourages risk creators to guard against 
losses, and, if they occur anyway, to provide compensation to victims and spread 
the cost of doing so amongst those who have benefited from the risk-creating 
activity.56  The modern formulation of vicarious liability for copyright infringement 
evolved from two distinct lines of authority:  the so called ―dance hall‖ cases, 
which held music venue proprietors liable where they financially profited from 
infringements committed by independent musicians at their premises, and the 
―landlord‖ cases, in which defendants avoided liability as long as they had no real 
financial interest in that infringement or ability to prevent it from occurring.57  
These parallel lines of authority were unified in 1963 by the Second Circuit in 
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co.58  Since then, vicarious liability has 
been accepted as accruing whenever ―the right and ability to supervise coalesce 
with an obvious and direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted 
materials.‖59 
Several physical world assumptions are inherent in this formulation of vicarious 
infringement.  Firstly, the doctrine is heavily premised on the assumption that 
everybody is bound by physical world rules.  As outlined above, the intuitive and 
unacknowledged understanding that we have of the physical world‘s constraints 
obviously informed the law‘s response to earlier cases.  If certain things were 
infeasible, impossible or impractical in the physical world, it was assumed—
probably without any explicit thought being given to the matter at all—that they 
would be infeasible, impossible or impractical full stop.  In the vicarious liability 
context, this is manifested particularly clearly in the doctrine‘s treatment of control.  
Decades of physical world precedent in the vicarious liability context suggested 
that persons who culpably facilitated a third party‘s infringement would generally 
have some control over that infringement.  In physical world scenarios, such as 
 
 54. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 261–62. 
 55. Compare Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright 
Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1833, 1843 (2000) 
[hereinafter Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability], with MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.04[A][3] (2009) (arguing that contributory liability is based on enterprise 
liability—―A separate avenue for third-party liability in the copyright sphere is contributory 
infringement, which forms an outgrowth of the tort concept of enterprise liability‖).  However, the 
theory of enterprise liability does not seem to justify or support contributory liability, which is 
concerned with knowledge of, and participation in, the third party infringement.  Instead, it is concerned 
with holding liable those that are best able to prevent losses regardless of their knowledge.  In these 
circumstances, Professor Yen‘s opinion should be preferred.  See generally Gregory C. Keating, The 
Theory of Enterprise Liability and Common Law Strict Liability, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1285, 1286 (2001) 
(providing a more detailed examination of enterprise liability). 
 56. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability, supra note 55, at 1843, 1846. 
 57. See, e.g., Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1938); Dreamland Ball Room v. Shapiro, 
Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1929). 
 58. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963). 
 59. Id. at 307. 
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where a swap meet organizer rents stalls to infringers, or where a department store 
owner leases space where bootleg records are sold, control flows naturally from the 
parties‘ involvement, and it is often difficult to imagine how it could be eliminated 
without considerable loss of efficiency or profit.
 60  Accordingly, the law evolved to 
require some degree of control over third party infringement before liability would 
attach.  Since most facilitators of infringement could not practicably eliminate 
control in the physical world context, this worked well as a mechanism for 
identifying wrongdoers. 
Vicarious liability‘s modern formulation is also implicitly premised on two other 
physical world assumptions:  the related ideas that developing, manufacturing and 
disseminating distribution products to market is expensive, and that distribution 
technologies that facilitate widespread infringement are developed for profit.  
These assumptions flow from one another:  If it is expensive to develop a 
distribution technology, then it makes sense to assume that it will not be developed 
unless there is a reasonable prospect of recouping that initial investment.  These 
assumptions are apparent in the second element of the doctrine, which requires 
there to be a direct financial interest in the third party infringement in order for 
liability to accrue.61  This was part thought to be a suitable indicator of liability, 
since, as discussed in the previous Part, anybody who had invested the time and 
money necessary to facilitate any significant amount of infringement was assumed 
to be seeking some profit in return.  The corollary was that anybody who was 
facilitating infringement without the anticipation of any financial profit was such a 
small fry as to not be worth pursuing. 
B.  CONTRIBUTORY LIABILITY 
The second doctrine in American law‘s pre-P2P secondary liability toolkit was 
contributory liability, which has its roots in a fundamental common law principle 
known as joint tortfeasor liability.62  Direct or indirect intellectual property 
infringement constitutes a tort, and joint tortfeasor liability provides that one who 
knowingly participates in or furthers a tort is jointly and severally liable with the 
primary tortfeasor.63  In contrast to vicarious liability, which is concerned with 
relationships, contributory liability emphasizes fault.64  Its basis is the idea ―that 
one who directly contributes to another‘s infringement should be held 
accountable.‖65  That origin dictates the focus of the doctrine.  It is intended to 
 
 60. See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d 259; Shapiro, Bernstein & Co, 316 F.2d 304. 
 61. Gershwin Publ‘g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971). 
 62. See, e.g., Harper v. Shoppel, 26 F. 519 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886) (one of the earliest cases to apply 
principles of joint tortfeasorship to copyright infringement). 
 63. Jane C. Ginsburg & Sam Ricketson, Inducers and Authorisers:  A Comparison of the U.S. 
Supreme Court‟s Grokster Decision and the Australian Federal Court‟s KaZaa Ruling, 11(1) MEDIA & 
ARTS L. REV. 1, 2 (2006); Alfred C. Yen, Sony, Tort Doctrines, and the Puzzle of Peer-To-Peer, 55 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 815, 826 (2005) [hereinafter Yen, Sony].  See also Screen Gems-Columbia 
Music, Inc., v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). 
 64. Alfred C. Yen, Third-Party Copyright Liability After Grokster, supra note 3, at 195. 
 65. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264. 
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capture those who are significantly involved in copyright infringement—who have 
―acted in concert‖ with the primary infringer—in situations where that conduct 
technically falls outside the definition of direct infringement.66 
Contributory liability was given life independent of its joint tortfeasorship 
origins in the landmark decision of Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists 
Management Inc.67  In that case, the Second Circuit held that contributory liability 
exists where ―one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes, 
or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another.‖68  Knowledge may 
be actual or constructive, but should precede the infringing activity.69  Timely 
knowledge of third party infringement is not sufficient in itself for liability to 
accrue:  the defendant must also have ―induced, caused, or materially contributed‖ 
to that infringement.70  While the issue of liability for ―inducing‖ infringement 
would eventually assume tremendous significance in the P2P context, pre-P2P 
contributory liability authorities paid scant attention to what it meant to ―induce.‖71  
Instead, they focused primarily on the concept of ―material contribution,‖ and in so 
doing divided relevant acts of assistance into two broad categories.72  The first 
covered situations where a company or individual had directly participated in the 
third party‘s infringement, for example through the provision of labor.73  The 
second encompassed situations where the defendant‘s contribution to the 
infringement was to supply the site, facilities or materials used by the third party to 
facilitate the infringement.74  Since P2P software providers participate in their 
users‘ infringements by providing the tools that enable them to commit those acts, 
it was the latter line of authority that was to prove crucial in the P2P context. 
The scope and content of the modern contributory liability law is also driven by 
a number of under-recognized physical world assumptions.  Since the pre-P2P law 
suggested that a defendant‘s knowledge should be held at a time it could do 
something to prevent the third party infringement, control is a de facto element of 
contributory liability.75  Accordingly, the above discussion of the physical world 
assumptions underpinning vicarious liability‘s control element is supported in the 
contributory liability context as well.  The knowledge element can also separately 
 
 66. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 8.1 (3d ed. 2005) (note I have updated 
all references to Goldstein to reflect the 2011-1 supplement).  See also Jeffrey Lewis, The Yellow 
Submarine Steers Clear of U.S. Copyright Law:  The Ninth Circuit Re-examines the Doctrine of 
Contributory Infringement, 18 LOY. L.A. INT‘L & COMP. L. REV. 371, 378 (1996). 
 67. Gershwin Publ‘g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971). 
 68. Id. at 1162 (internal note omitted). 
 69. See NIMMER, supra note 55, at § 12.04[A][3][a]; Craig Grossman, The Evolutionary Drift of 
Vicarious Liability and Contributory Infringement:  From Interstitial Gap Filler to Arbiter of the 
Content Wars, 58 SMU L. REV. 357, 381 (2005).  See, e.g., Schuchart & Assocs. v. Solo Serve Corp., 
No. SA-81-CA-5, 1983 WL 1147, at *1, *7 (W.D. Tex. June 28, 1983). 
 70. Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162. 
 71. Yen, Third-Party Copyright Liability After Grokster, supra note 3 at 195. 
 72. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 66, at § 8.1. 
 73. See id. 
 74. See id. 
 75. See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 69 at 382. 
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be seen as being premised on the assumption that physical world rules have 
universal application.  Contributory liability is intended to hold accountable those 
defendants that are significantly involved with copyright infringements, to the 
extent that they can be seen as being somehow personally at fault for that tort being 
committed.76  Knowledge, held at the time that the defendant was materially 
contributing to that infringement, has traditionally been seen as a good indicator of 
this.77  That‘s because, in the physical world cases that shaped the law, such 
knowledge tended to flow naturally from liability-attracting conduct.  For example, 
it is unlikely that a swap meet proprietor that provides the site and facilities for 
widespread infringement could avoid knowing that its premises are being put to 
that purpose, or for the organizer of a concert to avoid knowing that unlicensed 
music is going to be performed.  In such physical world scenarios, knowledge 
flows as a consequence of the ordinary course of business and is not something that 
can easily be avoided by a defendant who is culpably contributing to that 
infringement. 
The development of contributory liability‘s material contribution element 
similarly indicates reliance on physical world assumptions.  As signposted above, 
the law evolved to recognize two types of assistance that might satisfy this element: 
direct assistance such as the provision of labor, or the supply of the ―site and 
facilities‖ necessary to facilitate that infringement.78  Years of physical world 
precedent demonstrated that culpable facilitators of copyright infringement fell 
within one or other of these categories, and it seems that courts simply did not 
envisage the possibility that it might be possible for vast amounts of copyright 
infringement to be facilitated in the absence of either. 
C.  SAFE HARBORS 
The pre-P2P secondary liability law also featured some carve-outs from liability.  
These primarily consisted of the DMCA safe harbors and the staple article of 
commerce or Sony doctrine.  The DMCA safe harbors played a very minimal role 
in the P2P software litigation, and this Article will not explore them further.79  
Sony, however, played a prominent role.  The doctrine was formulated by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in 1984 in response to litigation seeking to hold the manufacturer of 
 
 76. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996) (providing that 
―one who directly contributes to another‘s infringement should be held accountable‖). 
 77. See, e.g., Gershwin Publ‘g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d 
Cir. 1971); Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264. 
 78. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 66, at § 8.1. 
 79. For a fuller examination of the DMCA safe harbor regime, see id. at §§ 8.31–8.55; Mark A. 
Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 
56 STAN. L. REV. 1346, 1369–72 (2004); Mike Scott, Safe Harbors under the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL‘Y 99 (2005-2006); Yen, Internet Service Provider 
Liability, supra note 55, at 1881–85; Zittrain, supra note 44, at 265–70.  Regarding the application of the 
safe harbors in P2P litigation, see Robert A. Gilmore, Peer-to-Peer:  Copyright Jurisprudence in the 
New File-Sharing World, the Post Grokster Landscape of Indirect Copyright Infringement and the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 5 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 85, 116–119 (2004). 
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the Betamax tape recorder liable for the infringements of its users.80  The Court 
responded to that argument by importing a doctrine from the patent law, holding 
that ―the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of commerce, 
does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used for 
legitimate, unobjectionable purposes.‖81  It then went even further, adding: 
―[i]ndeed, it need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses.‖82 
However, the Sony decision left a number of vital questions unanswered.  It was 
never made clear what exactly it meant to be ―merely capable‖ of noninfringing 
uses, whether the protection extended to both secondary liability doctrines, how 
substantiality or commercial significance of noninfringing use should be measured 
or whether infringement could ever be significant enough to disqualify a provider 
from receiving the protection.83  These uncertainties long lay dormant until the 
emergence of rampant online infringement brought the law relating to secondary 
liability for copyright infringement to the forefront of public attention. 
III.  THE P2P LITIGATION 
When MP3 files of popular copyrighted music first began appearing online in 
early 1997, the Recording Industry Association of America adopted a strategy of 
aggressively targeting the owners of the hosting servers with takedown notices to 
get them pulled offline.84  Although individuals simply reuploaded them at other 
locations, the strategy proved highly effective.  The constant removal of pages 
resulted in attempts by Internet users often being met with ―file not found‖ errors, 
making the process time-consuming and frustrating.85  By the end of 1999, 
―[s]earches for MP3 files that had typically been posted on Web sites, FTP sites, 
and newsgroups often proved fruitless.‖86  Professor Stuart Biegel has observed 
that, at this point, ―many commentators predicted that the controversy was ending 
and that the RIAA had won.‖87 
 
 80. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 420 (1984). 
 81. Id. at 442. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See David G. Post, Annemarie Bridy & Timothy Sandefur, ‗Nice Questions‟ Unanswered:  
Grokster, Sony‟s Staple Article of Commerce Doctrine, and the Deferred Verdict on Internet File 
Sharing, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 235, 246 (2004–2005) [hereinafter Post, „Nice Questions‟ Unanswered].  
See also Jay Dratler, Common-sense (Federal) Common Law Adrift in a Statutory Sea, or Why Grokster 
was a Unanimous Decision, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 413, 427–428 (2006). 
 84. From 1998, such takedown demands became formalized by the DMCA safe harbor 
provisions, which are, among other things, contingent on the ―expeditious‖ removal of allegedly 
infringing content upon receipt of notice.  See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).  Matt Oppenheim, then the senior 
vice president of business and legal affairs for the RIAA, estimated that copyright owners had ―probably 
sent out well over half a million DMCA . . . cease and desist notices‖ by June 2003.  See Online News 
Hour - Forum:  Copyright Conundrum, PUB. BROAD. SERV. (June 2003), http://www.pbs.org/ 
newshour/forum/june03/copyright5.html. 
 85. JOSEPH MENN, ALL THE RAVE:  THE RISE AND FALL OF SHAWN FANNING‘S NAPSTER 29 
(2003). 
 86. See BIEGEL, supra note 38, at xii. 
 87. Id. 
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However some users persevered, and one of those happened to complain to his 
college roommate about the frustrating glut of dead links.88  That roommate was 
Shawn Fanning, who reasoned that the shortcomings of existing online music 
distribution could be bypassed by developing an application that maintained a fluid 
index that could tell users what music was available at any given moment.89  It 
would be far less vulnerable to takedowns because the content would be hosted by 
individuals rather than corporations, and its real-time structure would make it 
impervious to the scourge of dead links.90  Fanning executed these ideas in a 
program called Napster, releasing the first beta version on June 1, 1999.91  An 
unprecedented surge of infringement followed.92  So did a lawsuit by record 
companies. 93 
A.  NAPSTER 
While Napster‘s real-time index facilitated communications between infringing 
users, it did not itself engage in any direct infringement:  the actual transfers of 
content occurred directly between the hosting and requesting users.94  Accordingly, 
the lawsuits alleged that Napster, Inc. was secondarily liable for the infringements 
committed by its users, and the plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to shut it 
down.95 
Napster‘s users had clearly engaged in the direct infringement that is a 
prerequisite to secondary liability.96  The real issue was whether Napster, Inc. was 
sufficiently likely to be held contributorily or vicariously liable for those 
infringements so as to justify the award of a preliminary injunction against it.  The 
District Court held that it was, and on appeal, the Ninth Circuit unanimously upheld 
almost all of the lower court‘s conclusions.97  In doing so, however, it struggled 
mightily to apply existing physical world precedent to the code-based Napster 
technology, and its judgment would prove highly vulnerable to exploitation by 
speculators who better understood the differences between the two paradigms. 
 
 88. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 902 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
 89. MENN, supra note 85, at 27 (2003). 
 90. Id. at 34. 
 91. Wu, When Code Isn‟t Law, supra note 4, at 728. 
 92. See Zittrain, supra note 44, at 281 (describing Napster as ―the open air drug market of 
copyright infringement‖). 
 93. See Courtney Macavinta, Recording Industry Sues Music Start-Up, Cites Black Market, 
CNET NEWS, (Dec. 7, 1999, 7:45 PM), http://news.cnet.com/Recording-industry-sues-music-start-up% 
2C-cites-black-market/2100-1023_3-234092.html. 
 94. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1012 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 95. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 900 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
 96. Id. at 911–15.  See also Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Use and Excuse on the Internet, 24 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 30–34 (2000) (providing a more detailed examination of the District Court and 
then the Ninth Circuit‘s treatment of the fair use argument); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative 
Destruction of Copyright:  Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 
263, 287–90 (2002). 
 97. A&M Records, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 920, 922; A&M Records, 239 F.3d at 1004. 
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1.  Contributory Liability 
Although it upheld the District Court‘s finding that Napster, Inc. was likely to be 
held contributorily liable for its users‘ infringements, the Ninth Circuit‘s reasoning 
departed from that of the lower court in a number of critical ways.  The most 
significant disagreement concerned the scope of the Sony doctrine.98  One of the 
longstanding uncertainties surrounding its application was whether or not the Sony 
Court had intended the protection to apply to all forms of secondary liability, as 
opposed to just contributory or vicarious infringement.99  This uncertainty arose 
from the notoriously confusing terminology in the area.  In its judgment, the 
Supreme Court used the terms ―contributory‖ and ―vicarious‖ liability 
interchangeably, without acknowledging that they actually constituted two 
independent doctrines within the copyright law, and without making clear whether 
it intended to use the terms in their broad or narrow senses.100  This meant that, 
when it held that ―the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of 
commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely 
used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes,‖ it was unclear whether it was 
referring to contributory liability in the broad sense (to cover all forms of secondary 
liability) or the narrow.101 
The District Court had seemingly treated Sony as a blanket defense, one that 
would protect Napster, Inc. from any form of secondary liability—whether 
contributory or vicarious—as long as its product was capable of substantial 
noninfringing uses.102  However, the Ninth Circuit held that Sony was in fact far 
less broad than that, and applied only to contributory liability.103  Narrower still, it 
interpreted it as merely being ―a gloss‖ on that doctrine‘s knowledge element.104  
As noted above, the knowledge element of contributory liability can generally be 
satisfied by either actual or constructive knowledge.105  In Sony, after finding that 
the defendant had no actual knowledge of the third-party infringement, the Court 
had then ―declined to impute the requisite level of knowledge‖ because its product 
was ―capable of both infringing and ‗substantial noninfringing uses.‘‖106  The Ninth 
Circuit interpreted this as meaning that it could not impute to Napster constructive 
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knowledge of third party infringement simply because its technology could be used 
to infringe the plaintiffs‘ copyrights.107 
If Sony only operates to prevent the imputation of constructive knowledge, the 
consequence is that it offers no protection in circumstances where the defendant has 
actual knowledge of third party infringement.  The Ninth Circuit upheld the lower 
court‘s findings that Napster, Inc. had materially contributed to the infringing 
activity by providing the necessary ―site and facilities,‖ and that it did in fact have 
actual knowledge of its users‘ infringements.108  In light of the latter finding, it was 
not strictly necessary for the Court to consider whether the rule in Sony would have 
allowed knowledge to be imputed.  Nonetheless, it chose to do so, and the resulting 
analysis gave Napster‘s successors considerable food for thought.  The analysis 
suggested that Sony operates somewhat differently depending on whether the 
technology at issue is a product or a service.109  If a product, Sony bars constructive 
knowledge of third party infringements from being imputed as long as it is capable 
of substantial noninfringing uses.110  Where a defendant provides a service, 
however, Sony operates to prevent the provider from being liable for contributory 
infringement by virtue of the mere fact that its system‘s structure allows for 
infringement to occur, and says that the service provider has no general duty to 
monitor for infringement.111  However, it does not extend so far as to prevent 
contributory liability from being imposed where the operator learns of specific 
infringing material available via the system and fails to take steps to remove it.112 
Thus the Ninth Circuit distinguished products (such as the Napster application 
that was used to download infringing music) from ongoing services (such as 
Napster, Inc.‘s provision of the servers and the search engine that enabled that 
infringement to take place).113  Because of the more favorable treatment given to 
product providers, Zittrain argues that the decision ―implies that had Napster 
merely built the Napster server and client software and then conveyed the server 
operation to someone else, it likely would have escaped liability under Sony.‖114  
By suggesting that constructive knowledge can only be imputed where a defendant 
has some ongoing control over the infringing activity, the Ninth Circuit sent a clear 
message to future developers that they could avoid liability by eliminating such 
control—as long as they also ensured that they had no actual knowledge of end 
user infringement. 
2.  Vicarious Liability 
The Ninth Circuit upheld the District Court‘s finding that Napster, Inc. had a 
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direct financial interest in its users‘ infringements on the basis that ―the availability 
of infringing material ‗act[ed] as a draw‘ for customers,‖ and because its ―future 
revenue [was] directly dependent upon ‗increases in user-base.‘‖115  However, it 
diverged from the lower court‘s reasoning when addressing the second element of 
the tort. 
The District Court held that Napster, Inc. had the right and ability to supervise 
its users‘ infringements because it could ―police‖ the Napster system.116  The Ninth 
Circuit agreed, but introduced a vital caveat:  that Napster, Inc. could avoid 
vicarious liability despite its ability to police third party infringement if it exercised 
that right ―to its fullest extent.‖117  It noted that Napster, Inc.‘s ability to police 
infringement was limited by the fact that the software was not coded to ―‗read‘ the 
content of indexed files, other than to check that they [we]re in the proper MP3 
format.‖118  In these circumstances, it held, Napster, Inc.‘s right to police was 
limited to finding infringing content via its indexes, and terminating the access of 
infringing users in accordance with its contractual ability to do so.119  Since 
Napster, Inc. had not actually exercised this power to the fullest extent, the caveat 
did not protect it from liability.  However, the fact it was introduced at all is 
surprising in light of vicarious liability‘s roots in enterprise liability.120  That 
doctrine has traditionally imposed strict liability on the supervising party where a 
wrong occurs, regardless of fault.121  This encourages risk creators to guard against 
losses, and, if they occur anyway, to spread the cost of providing compensation to 
victims across those who have benefited from the risk-creating activity.122  It is 
intended to maximize the ability of the person who has suffered from the wrong to 
obtain a remedy.123  The idea that a defendant can escape liability by exercising its 
right to police to the fullest extent seems contrary to that objective.  And, of course, 
by telling technology providers that they will not be vicariously liable if they 
eliminate their ability to control or police their systems, the Court incentivized 
them to try and do just that. 
The case was remanded back to the District Court to modify its injunction in 
accordance with the Ninth Circuit‘s findings.124  Napster never managed to 
satisfactorily comply with the revised injunction, and on July 1, 2001, its servers 
were switched off for good, instantly damming its stream of free music.125 
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3.  Roadmap to Avoiding Liability 
The message sent by the Ninth Circuit to Napster‘s successors was clear:  create 
a product that achieves the same end result as Napster, but eliminate any control 
over the resulting third party infringement, and you will escape liability for both 
contributory and vicarious infringement.  In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit 
relied heavily on an assumption that some ongoing service was a necessary aspect 
of facilitating large scale infringement via P2P file sharing software.  From a 
physical world viewpoint that makes perfect sense.  Napster, Inc. was essentially 
acting as a facilitator between those that offered infringing content and those that 
wanted to obtain it, and in the physical world it is difficult to see how such 
―matchmaking‖ could possibly occur in the absence of any ongoing service.  
Decades of physical world precedent gave illusory support to the court‘s 
assumption:  After all, if it was practicable for facilitators of large scale third party 
infringement to eliminate control and knowledge of that infringement, those 
secondary liability doctrines would undoubtedly have evolved very differently.  In 
these circumstances, it must have seemed to the Court that this was a good basis for 
distinguishing Napster (which it wanted to hold liable) from technologies like 
Sony‘s Betamax (which it did not). 
But the Ninth Circuit‘s solution failed to take into account the differences 
between the physical and virtual paradigms.  When Fanning sat down to code a 
solution to the glut of dead links, he gave no thought whatsoever to the scope and 
content of the existing secondary liability law, or to whether his solution might fall 
foul of it.126  As it happened, the centralized architecture he adopted fell squarely 
within the existing doctrine.  However, that design was not the only way to 
facilitate large scale P2P infringement.  The Ninth Circuit‘s decision provided a 
―roadmap‖ to avoiding liability.127  That map read:  ―Don‘t be at the center of the 
P2P network and be sure not to have any ability to police the network.  
Intentionally relinquish control over the software.‖128  Seeking to do so, they took 
advantage of the flexibility of software code to come up with more and more 
innovative and anarchic designs that attempted to eliminate Napster‘s liability-
attracting elements whilst facilitating precisely the same end result.129  The 
providers of three such technologies, Aimster, Grokster and Morpheus, were 
particularly blatant in their attempts to code their way out of liability,130 and the 
very different responses of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits to those efforts provide 
grist for an instructive comparison. 
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B.  AIMSTER 
The Aimster software largely mimicked Napster‘s design, with one vital 
addition; it also encrypted all network communications between users.131  This 
effectively prevented everybody except the originating and receiving users from 
having actual knowledge of infringement.  Its creator John Deep argued that this 
made it ―impossible [for him] to know exactly what files were being shared.‖132 
Trusting that he had successfully coded Aimster to fall outside the strict confines 
of the existing contributory liability law, Deep brazenly bragged that Aimster more 
closely resembled the physical-world Betamax than the software-based Napster.  
―Napster used central computer servers, which could or did know what music files 
were being swapped.  Aimster is more like a VCR; users might pirate movies, but 
the VCR manufacturer has no knowledge of it.‖133  This was a blatant attempt to 
exploit the physical world/software world divide.  Recognizing that the existing 
secondary liability law had evolved in reliance on the physical world assumption 
that culpable defendants would not easily be able to eliminate knowledge of third 
party infringement, Deep had simply coded his technology in a way that eliminated 
the possibility of his ever having actual knowledge, and relied on the Sony doctrine 
to prevent constructive knowledge from being imputed.  Unfortunately for him, the 
District Court did not appear to appreciate the logic underlying that decision, and it 
granted a preliminary injunction enjoining the defendants from secondarily 
infringing the plaintiffs‘ copyrights.134  Deep appealed to the Seventh Circuit.135 
Deep‘s efforts to exploit the physical world/software world divide by 
eliminating control and knowledge of third party infringements placed the Seventh 
Circuit in an unenviable position.  He had neatly sidestepped decades of authority 
dictating that knowledge was an essential corollary to contributory liability by 
inserting a few extra lines of code into a basic piece of software.  A strict 
application of the physical world principles reiterated by the Ninth Circuit in 
Napster would likely have resulted in Deep avoiding liability simply because of the 
way he coded his software regardless of his behavior.136  However, the Seventh 
Circuit refused to allow that to happen, and instead departed from Napster‘s 
reasoning in a way that implicitly recognized the differences between physical 
technologies and their software-based counterparts. 
1.  Contributory Liability 
The first point of diversion related to the significance of a defendant‘s 
technology being capable of substantial non-infringing uses.  The Ninth Circuit in 
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Napster had treated the phrase ―capability of substantial non-infringing uses‖ with 
considerable deference, going so far as to chastise the District Court for failing to 
give proper consideration to Napster‘s actual and potential legitimate uses.137  By 
contrast, the Seventh Circuit actually eliminated ―capability of substantial 
noninfringing uses‖ as Sony‘s trigger.138  Under its analysis, a product‘s current or 
future capability for substantial noninfringing uses is only the first step towards 
being protected under Sony.  Once it has been established that a product has both 
infringing and noninfringing uses, it is then necessary to make ―some estimate of 
the respective magnitudes of these uses.‖139  That is, the Seventh Circuit treated the 
product‘s capability of substantial noninfringing uses as ―a necessary, rather than a 
sufficient, condition‖ to the avoidance of liability.140  Under this test an Internet file 
sharing service like Aimster cannot prevent knowledge from being imputed simply 
because it is capable of substantial noninfringing uses.  Instead, it must show ―that 
it would have been disproportionately costly for [it] to eliminate or at least reduce 
substantially the infringing uses.‖141  By requiring the relative costs and benefits of 
defendant technologies to be taken into account in determining liability, and at least 
implicitly acknowledging that code-based technologies can be much easier to 
modify, including post-distribution, than their physical counterparts, this approach 
forces software providers to take more accountability for their design decisions. 
The Seventh Circuit also disagreed with the Ninth Circuit‘s interpretation of 
Sony in other ways.  The Ninth Circuit in Napster had interpreted Sony as operating 
only to prevent constructive knowledge of infringement from being imputed if a 
defendant‘s product was capable of substantial noninfringing uses.142  But if the 
defendant had actual knowledge of infringement, it could be contributorily liable 
regardless of the nature of its product.143  The Seventh Circuit disagreed with the 
District Court‘s analysis in Napster on two counts.  Firstly, it held that Sony 
extended to ongoing services as well as products, giving such providers a greater 
degree of protection.144  Secondly, it disagreed that defendants with actual 
knowledge should automatically lose Sony‟s protection, holding that this would 
sometimes be ―contrary to the clear import of the Sony decision.‖145  The basis of 
this finding seemed to be that Sony itself had avoided liability even though it must 
have known that a significant proportion of its users were in fact putting the 
Betamax to infringing uses.146  Accordingly, the Court found that if the provider of 
a service that facilitated infringing as well as noninfringing uses had actual 
knowledge of the infringement but would have found it ―highly burdensome‖ to 
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prevent the infringement, it may be inappropriate to hold it liable.147  That is, a 
service provider‘s knowledge and ability to prevent its users from infringing would 
certainly be a relevant consideration in determining its liability, but liability should 
not be automatically imposed on that basis alone. 
When applied these principles to Aimster, the Seventh Circuit held that Deep‘s 
utilization of encryption amounted to willful blindness, and that Deep could not 
rely on it ―to prevent himself from learning what surely he strongly suspects to be 
the case:  that the users of his service—maybe all the users of his service—are 
copyright infringers.‖148  The Court then went on to consider whether Aimster 
nonetheless ought to be protected under Sony.  It noted that the Aimster tutorial 
featuring infringing examples was an ―invitation to infringement‖ that went beyond 
anything Sony had done, and that Club Aimster was intended solely to facilitate 
access to the most popular—and ―invariably‖ copyrighted—music downloads.149  
The Court held that while this evidence ―d[id] not exclude the possibility of 
substantial noninfringing uses of the Aimster system, [it was] sufficient . . . to shift 
the burden of production to Aimster to demonstrate that its service has substantial 
noninfringing uses.‖150  The Court considered that the Aimster defendants could not 
avoid liability by showing that their technology was physically capable of being put 
to noninfringing use if in fact it was only ever used to infringe.151 
Even if Deep had managed to prove that the Aimster service had substantial 
noninfringing uses, this would not have been sufficient to avoid liability.  Instead, 
under the Seventh Circuit‘s analysis, Aimster would have then been obliged to 
demonstrate that it would have been ―disproportionately costly‖ to eliminate or 
substantially reduce the infringement.152  Deep would have failed to do so since he 
did not ―present evidence that the provision of an encryption capability effective 
against the service provider itself added important value to the service or saved 
significant cost.‖153  Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit concluded that Deep was 
likely to be held liable for contributory infringement if that matter was to proceed 
to trial. 154 
2.  Vicarious Liability 
The Seventh Circuit was undecided about whether Deep was also vicariously 
liable for Aimster‘s users‘ infringements, and did not decide the matter.  However, 
it noted that the Supreme Court did not hold Sony vicariously liable even though, 
by eliminating the fast forward function, it could have dramatically reduced the 
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level of infringement.155  Accordingly, it considered that Deep‘s failure to remove 
Aimster‘s encryption feature and monitor its network may not be enough to render 
him vicariously liable for the resulting infringement.156 
An attempt to appeal the Seventh Circuit‘s decision failed when the U.S. 
Supreme Court denied certiorari.157 
C.  GROKSTER AND MORPHEUS 
The Seventh Circuit‘s unwillingness to be seduced by the undeniable logic of 
Deep‘s argument meant the failure of this attempt to use antiregulatory code to fall 
outside the existing law.  But as the following section will demonstrate, the 
providers of Grokster and Morpheus enjoyed considerably more success, 
persuading the Ninth Circuit to strictly apply physical world law to their software 
based technologies, and successfully exploiting the physical world/software world 
divide all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
The Morpheus and Grokster file sharing clients were powered by the Gnutella 
and FastTrack P2P protocols.  Protocols are sets of rules that govern how a 
technology will operate.158  Clients are implementations of those rules.159  Gnutella 
was written secretly in just two weeks by two programmers who sought to 
eliminate Napster‘s liability-attracting elements, whilst facilitating the same end 
result.160  Their ultimate employer, AOL (then deep in merger negotiations with 
content giant Time Warner), did not share this interest, and the program was 
quickly withdrawn.161  But it had already been downloaded thousands of times, and 
within days source code successfully implementing the protocol had been released 
into the public domain—although whether obtained solely as the result of reverse-
engineering efforts or with the surreptitious assistance of the original renegade 
developers has never been entirely clear.162 
Although independent programmers continued to develop the software, their 
success was mixed.  Frankel and Pepper had ingeniously coded Gnutella to create a 
fully distributed network with no centralized features.163  This meant that all of the 
tasks that would normally be performed by central servers were instead shared 
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equally amongst every individual on the network.164  The absence of any 
centralized points meant that if any part of the Gnutella network were to be shut 
down, it would have little effect on the rest.  This design eliminated the centralized 
elements that had led to Napster‘s downfall.  But, the trade-off was that it also 
eliminated much of the efficiency that had contributed to Napster‘s success. 
Gnutella‘s biggest problem was a lack of scalability, the ability to expand 
capacity as the network grew.165  Since its decentralized design forced all network 
traffic to go through all users, and each message transmitted on the network took up 
a certain amount of bandwidth, the network inevitably became more heavily 
burdened as the number of users and messages increased.166  Napster had addressed 
that problem by adding more and more servers to its central array as more users 
joined its network.167  Lacking the ability to respond the same way, the Gnutella 
network eventually crashed under the weight of its traffic, remaining out of 
operation for over a month.168  Despite Gnutella‘s problems, users hungry for free 
music continued to utilize it, and the day after Napster was permanently shut down, 
Gnutella‘s usage surged by seventeen percent.169 
The Napster model was technically robust, but legally vulnerable, while 
Gnutella was technically frail, but less clearly liable under the existing law. 
European entrepreneurs Niklas Zennström and Janus Friis spied opportunity in this 
situation, and hired a team of Estonian programmers to create the FastTrack 
protocol.170  Fasttrack was carefully designed with enough centralization to operate 
with a satisfactory degree of efficiency, whilst having little enough [little enough of 
what?  This is vague:  little enough centralization] to avoid its providers being 
liable for its users‘ infringements under the existing law.171  As Wu puts it, 
FastTrack sought to ―strike a balance between suability and scalability.‖172 
The software implementing the protocol was incorporated into the Kazaa Media 
Desktop (―KMD‖) client software.173  Its solution to the problems that plagued 
Napster and Gnutella was to utilize a hybrid network architecture that took 
advantage of the heterogeneity of its users.  Upon connecting to the network, users 
would automatically be designated either a node or a supernode.174  Nodes were 
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ordinary users, analogous to the individuals who connected to the Napster 
network.175  Supernodes were the best resourced users, the individuals with the 
fastest Internet connections and most computer processing power, and they carried 
out duties similar to those that had been performed by Napster‘s central servers.176  
A user would unknowingly be designated a node or supernode depending on their 
resources and the current needs of the network.177  Thus, instead of treating all 
users equally, it distinguished the users with the most powerful computers and the 
fastest Internet connections and then co-opted their resources to run the network.  
As a result, the FastTrack network was far less vulnerable to the bottlenecking and 
delays that plagued Gnutella.178 
FastTrack and KMD were initially controlled by Zennström and Friis through 
their Dutch incorporated company Kazaa BV.179  KMD‘s source code was a closely 
guarded secret, but after its July 2000 release, Kazaa BV also licensed the software 
to two other companies:  Grokster Ltd., which distributed it as Grokster, and 
StreamCast Networks Inc., which implemented it as an early version of 
Morpheus.180  At that point all three branded versions were identical in all essential 
respects.  FastTrack‘s hybrid structure scaled much better than the original version 
of Gnutella, and although the Kazaa client alone was downloaded an estimated 317 
million times in less than four years, the network never became too overloaded to 
function.181  Since users of all three clients were connected to the same network and 
could seamlessly share files with one another, the FastTrack network rapidly 
became an even more popular destination for infringing content than Napster had 
ever been.182 
It wasn‘t surprising then that the FastTrack technologies quickly became the 
primary enforcement target in the war against P2P file sharing.  In late 2001, right 
holders near simultaneously instituted lawsuits in the U.S. and the Netherlands, 
with the U.S. litigation sweeping up Kazaa BV, Grokster Ltd. and StreamCast 
Networks Inc., alleging that they ―created a 21st century piratical bazaar,‖ and 
seeking to hold them liable for the copyright infringements of their users.183  At the 
time the litigation began, StreamCast‘s Morpheus still utilized the FastTrack 
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technology.184  Soon afterward, however, a licensing dispute caused Morpheus 
users to be locked out of the FastTrack network, and StreamCast quickly created a 
new application based on the open source Gnutella.185  Thus, although FastTrack‘s 
owners and licensees were undeniably the primary target of the lawsuit, the 
Gnutella technology became entangled in the mess, as well.186  Each of the parties 
(other than Kazaa BV) cross-filed for summary judgment.187 
Gnutella and FastTrack appear to have both been carefully engineered to exploit 
the physical world/software world divide by eliminating the control that was 
essential to liability under the post-Napster law.  Neither of them utilized the kind 
of central server that was the basis of liability in Napster, and their developers had 
apparently followed the Ninth Circuit‘s roadmap carefully to ensure they did not 
provide any ongoing service or give their providers control over the networks.188  
Even if an attempt were made to shut them down altogether, the anarchic design of 
the networks would allow users to continue sharing files uninterrupted.189  The 
defendants clearly hoped that, combined with the fact that their products were 
technically capable of substantial noninfringing uses, this would be sufficient to 
code their way out of liability under the existing law.  That hope was to prove 
surprisingly well founded.  The District Court found that the providers of Grokster 
and Morpheus could not be held liable for the staggering infringement they 
facilitated under the existing law, and granted summary judgment in their favor 
accordingly.190  To the plaintiffs‘ dismay, the Ninth Circuit agreed.191  In fact, as 
the following paragraphs demonstrate, it swallowed whole the defendant‘s 
arguments as to why their products‘ technical architecture prevented their being 
liable under the existing law. 
1.  Contributory Liability 
The plaintiffs argued that Sony did not protect the defendants in this case 
because ―the vast majority of the software use is for copyright infringement.‖192  
This argument was consistent with the approach taken by the Seventh Circuit in 
Aimster.193  However, the Ninth Circuit declared that this ―misapprehen[ded] the 
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Sony standard.‖194  Sony, the Court explained, is relevant to the degree of 
knowledge necessary to make out contributory liability.195  ―If the product at issue 
is not capable of substantial or commercially significant noninfringing uses, then 
the copyright owner need only show that the defendant had constructive knowledge 
of the infringement.‖196  If however the product is capable of such noninfringing 
uses, as those in this case were, the Sony protection means that ―the copyright 
owner must demonstrate that the defendant had reasonable knowledge of specific 
infringing files and failed to act on that knowledge to prevent infringement.‖197  
The Court then held that the products at issue were indeed capable of substantial 
noninfringing uses.198  In a footnote, it observed that although the noninfringing 
uses may only constitute ten percent of the total, ―the volume of use would indicate 
a minimum of hundreds of thousands of legitimate file exchanges.‖199 
As a result of the Court‘s finding that the defendant technologies were capable 
of substantial noninfringing uses, contributory liability‘s knowledge element could 
only be satisfied by a finding of actual knowledge.200  The Ninth Circuit then 
upheld the District Court‘s finding that such actual knowledge must be held at a 
time the defendant was contributing to the third party infringement or could do 
something to stop it.201  This is something the defendants could technically never be 
capable of, since the way their software was coded meant that third party 
infringement always fell outside their control.  Indeed, it seems overwhelmingly 
likely that, to ensure this very outcome, the defendant technologies had been coded 
to eliminate the liability-attracting Napster-style central index in the first place.  
This meant that not only was the knowledge element not satisfied on the evidence 
before the Court, but that it never could be as long as the defendants retained their 
existing technological designs.202 
Even if constructive knowledge could have been imputed, the defendants would 
still have avoided a finding of contributory liability.  Just as the code underlying the 
defendant software applications prevented the knowledge element from being made 
out, it also succeeded in ensuring that the defendants had not committed the 
requisite ―material‖ contribution.203 
The Court held that one way in which material contribution can be made out is 
where a defendant provides the ―site and facilities‖ for infringement and ―fail[s] to 
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stop specific instances of infringement‖ once it has knowledge of them.204  It then 
upheld the District Court‘s finding that the defendants could not be said to have 
supplied such ―site and facilities‖205 since, as a consequence of the way the 
software was coded, ―[i]nfringing messages or file indices d[id] not reside on 
defendants‘ computers, nor d[id] defendants have the ability to suspend user 
accounts.‖206  The defendants were ―not access providers, and they [did] not 
provide file storage and index maintenance.‖207  Instead, ―it [wa]s the users of the 
software who, by connecting to each other over the internet, create[d] the network 
and provide[d] the access.‖208  Grokster‘s users connected or ―bootstrapped‖ to the 
network via the preset list of root supernodes that were analogous to Napster‘s 
central servers, but since those nodes were not controlled by Grokster Inc. their 
existence made no difference to its liability.209  In the Court‘s view, creating 
software that facilitated connection to independent networks without any need for 
assistance or intervention from the defendants was not a sufficiently ―material‖ 
contribution to any resulting infringement.210  Since the defendants had not 
provided the ―site and facilities‖ for infringement, and in the absence of sufficient 
evidence that they had ―materially contributed‖ in any other way, the contribution 
element was not satisfied.211 
The Court‘s analysis fails to recognize that the main reason why the defendants 
did not provide the ―site and facilities‖ necessary for infringement was almost 
certainly because they recognized that so-structuring their software was a direct 
route to liability, and therefore chose to engineer their products in a way that would 
place them outside the strict letter of the existing law.  To then hold that they were 
not obliged to exercise the rights that they did have over the resulting software—
again, because to do so would not be consistent with existing physical world 
precedent—seems to implicitly bless the continued exploitation of the differences 
between the physical and the virtual, and give technology providers a powerful 
advantage over rights holders. 
2.  Vicarious Liability 
For similar reasons, the Ninth Circuit held that the defendants also fell outside 
the existing formulation of vicarious liability.212  The sticking point, once again, 
was their carefully engineered inability to supervise the infringement.  The 
plaintiffs had argued that their ability to alter their software in a way that would 
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―prevent users from sharing copyrighted files‖ meant that the defendants did in fact 
have the requisite right and ability to supervise the third party infringement.213  
However, the Court emphatically rejected this argument: 
In arguing that this ability constitutes evidence of the right and ability to supervise, 
the Copyright Owners confuse the right and ability to supervise with the strong duty 
imposed on entities that have already been determined to be liable for vicarious 
copyright infringement; such entities have an obligation to exercise their policing 
powers to the fullest extent.214 
The Court further held that ―the potential duty a District Court may place on a 
vicariously liable defendant is not the same as the ‗ability‘ contemplated by the 
‗right and ability to supervise‘ test.‖215  Thus, the Court held, ―possibilities for 
upgrading software located on another person‘s computer are irrelevant to 
determining whether vicarious liability exists.‖216  It explained that the requisite 
―‗right and ability to supervise‘ describes a relationship between the defendant and 
the direct infringer.‖217  Citing Napster ―for the proposition that some degree of 
control over user behavior and the ability to terminate access were strong evidence 
of the control necessary to establish vicarious liability,‖ the Court held that in this 
case there was no evidence of such a relationship.218  ―The sort of monitoring and 
supervisory relationship that has supported vicarious liability in the past is 
completely absent in this case.‖219  The Court‘s analysis, and this conclusion in 
particular, is remarkable for its lack of enquiry into precisely why the relationship 
is different, and whether those differences ought to give rise to a different sort of 
treatment than those previous relationships.  Instead of doing so, however, it simply 
chose to accept that the architecture created by the underlying software code was 
sufficient to prevent liability from attaching. 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs‘ argument that ―[t]urning a blind 
eye to detectable acts of infringement for the sake of profit gives rise to liability,‖ 
holding that ―there is no separate ‗blind eye‘ theory or element of vicarious liability 
that exists independently of the traditional elements of liability.‖220  This contrasts 
with the approach taken by the Seventh Circuit, which held that the incorporation 
of encryption into Aimster‘s design constituted a form of willful blindness.221 
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit upheld the District Court‘s findings and granted 
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summary judgment in favor of the defendants.222  The defendants‘ aim of aligning 
themselves more closely with the VCR than with Napster had clearly succeeded: 
the District Court expressly noted that ―Grokster and StreamCast [were] not 
significantly different from companies that sell home video recorders or copy 
machines, both of which can be and are used to infringe copyrights . . . Absent 
evidence of active and substantial contribution to the infringement itself, 
Defendants cannot be liable.‖223  The combination of the defendants‘ coding their 
technologies to mimic the behavior of physical world hardware, and the Ninth 
Circuit‘s decision not to distinguish code-based from physical technologies, meant 
that the defendants successfully escaped liability under the existing law.224 
3.  Old Rules; New Game 
So far this Article has demonstrated that the pre-P2P secondary liability law 
evolved almost exclusively with reference to physical world scenarios and 
technologies, and thus came to rely on certain assumptions that had almost 
invariably held good in the physical world context.  One of the most significant was 
the idea that it would generally be infeasible, impossible or impractical for a person 
to culpably facilitate a third party‘s infringement without having some control over 
that infringement.  This came to underpin the two doctrines that then governed 
secondary liability for copyright infringement.  In the vicarious liability context this 
manifested in the requirement that the defendant has the ―right and ability to 
supervise‖ the third party infringement.225  In the contributory liability context, at 
least according to the Ninth Circuit‘s interpretation, it manifested in two ways:  the 
principle that liability depends on whether the defendant has actual knowledge of 
the third party infringement at the time they are contributing to it and can do 
something to stop it, and the way in which the Sony defense provides less 
advantageous treatment (by allowing constructive knowledge to be imputed) where 
a defendant has ongoing control over the infringing activity.226 
The reason why the law evolved in this manner was because, in the physical 
world scenarios that shaped it, control usually flowed naturally from the parties‘ 
involvement, and tended to be noneliminable except at the sacrifice of a 
considerable amount of efficiency or profit.  Since secondary infringers could not 
practicably eliminate control, it worked well as a mechanism for capturing 
wrongdoers in the physical world context, and successfully limited the number of 
 
 222. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1167. 
 223. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1043 (C.D. Cal. 
2003), aff‟d, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
 224. Wu, When Code Isn‟t Law, supra note 4, at 738 (arguing that the decision ―suggest[ed] that 
the changes in design ‗worked,‘ at least with respect to negating the element of control that sealed 
Napster‘s fate‖). 
 225. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963). 
 226. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1162–63; A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 
(9th Cir. 2001). 
(4) Giblin P2P 1/13/2012  9:20 AM 
2011] PHYSICAL WORLD ASSUMPTIONS AND SOFTWARE WORLD REALITIES 89 
end user infringements.227  However, as the P2P cases demonstrate, that physical 
world assumption doesn‘t necessarily hold in the software world context.  It turns 
out that P2P providers do not have to play by the same rules as the swap meet 
organizers, department store owners and concert controllers that came before them, 
and that there were a number of ways in which they could code their software to 
ensure that it could facilitate enormous amounts of unauthorized copying without 
their having any relevant control. 
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits were both faced with defendants that had 
deliberately coded their technologies to fall outside the strict boundary of the 
existing law.  The Ninth Circuit played the new game with the old rules, strictly 
applying earlier precedent to P2P file sharing software in the same way it believed 
it had been applied to the Betamax VCR.  But its application of existing physical 
world precedent to the defendant‘s code-based technologies caused it to conclude 
that the defendants should escape liability if their technologies were designed in a 
way that made it impossible for them to control their users‘ behavior—an outcome 
antithetical to what those principles were formulated to achieve.  After all, one of 
the primary purposes of secondary liability law is to provide a remedy to large 
scale infringement where it would be inefficient to target direct infringers.228 
Intuitively, this suggests ―that creators of peer-to-peer networks are more likely 
to be held liable when their networks lead to the unchecked infringement of 
copyrighted works, and less likely to be held liable when their networks retain 
some ability to prevent infringement.‖229  But the Ninth Circuit‘s analysis resulted 
in the opposite conclusion, actually encouraging software providers to design and 
unleash uncontrollable tools of infringement, even where infringement could be 
significantly reduced at minimal cost.230  By continuing to apply principles that 
evolved with reference to physical technologies to virtual ones, Picker argues that 
the Ninth Circuit ―ignores the new realities of networked products and what those 
should mean for ongoing design obligations.‖231  The end result was that the Ninth 
Circuit allowed the defendants to code their way out of liability, and gave future 
defendants a bright line guide to achieving that same end. 
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit seemed to recognize that some fundamental 
characteristic distinguished Aimster from its physical world predecessors, and 
responded by coming up with some new rules of its own.232  In beginning to 
acknowledge the differences between code-based and physical technologies, the 
Seventh Circuit imposed a previously unheard of form of ―code-based 
gatekeeping‖ liability on software providers that forced them to be more 
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accountable for their design decisions.233  This approach diverted from the strict 
application of preexisting precedent by suggesting that the relative amounts of 
infringing and noninfringing uses, as well as how easily infringement could have 
been avoided, should be taken into account in determining secondary liability.  This 
approach considers the ―relative costs and benefits‖ of defendant technologies, and 
acknowledges that code-based technologies can be much easier to modify, 
including postdistribution, than their physical counterparts.234 
However, there are problems with this approach as well.  As Yen points out, 
existing theories of secondary liability were not formulated to take such aspects 
into account.235  The Seventh Circuit was only able to render them relevant by 
stretching the Sony protection to cover the Aimster-shaped loophole.  Additionally, 
although the Court seemed to recognize some of the inherent differences between 
the code-based and physical paradigms, it did so only implicitly.  As a result, the 
broader principles it developed to respond to Aimster are also applicable to 
physical technologies, resulting in a continued conjunction of unlike technologies.  
As this Article makes clear, application of identical principles to the physical world 
and the software world can lead to ill-fitting outcomes.  Continued equation of the 
two stifles genuine debate over the differences between the two paradigms, and 
whether it may be appropriate to apply different liability standards to code-based 
and physical world technologies.  Some of the criticisms that have been leveled at 
the Seventh Circuit‘s decision are attributable to the fact that the principles it 
enunciated in Aimster apply equally to both. For example, one major 
disparagement is that the Seventh Circuit‘s approach ―contemplates a broad range 
of sweeping preemptive design changes . . . if a cost-benefit analysis, including 
evidence of current uses of the technology in question‖ suggests that it is 
appropriate to do so.236  Zittrain has described these design changes as ―analogous 
to requiring a VCR maker to remove the fast forward or record buttons.‖237  The 
fact that the Supreme Court rejected such a proposal when deciding Sony makes 
advocates for retaining that decision‘s protections critical of this reasoning.  If 
physical and virtual technologies were distinguished from one another, however, 
with the effect that the Seventh Circuit‘s solution did not apply to physical world 
technologies like the Betamax, its merits might have been more clearly apparent. 
Giving more direct consideration to the differences between the technologies 
could also result in better-tailored solutions for widespread infringement facilitated 
by P2P software.  By not explicitly recognizing the differences between physical 
world and software world technologies, the Seventh Circuit‘s reasoning remains 
vulnerable to exploitation to those who do so.  This is particularly the case with 
respect to its analysis regarding the knowledge element.  The Seventh Circuit 
thwarted the Aimster defendants‘ efforts to code their way out of contributory 
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liability‘s knowledge element by using the willful blindness framework.238  In the 
absence of willful blindness however, it seems that contributory infringement still 
requires actual or constructive knowledge to be made out before liability can 
accrue.239  This suggests that a P2P provider may still code its way out of liability if 
it eliminates the requisite degree of knowledge without being willfully blind to that 
infringement within the meaning of the existing law—a loophole just begging to be 
exploited by a future Johnny Deep.  If the judgment had expressly recognized the 
differences between physical and virtual technologies, instead of attempting to be 
broad enough to cover the unique characteristics of each, it may well have resulted 
in more precise and targeted standards.  As it stands, the Seventh Circuit‘s 
approach prevented the defendants from succeeding in their attempt to code their 
way out of liability under the existing law, but it also resulted in a doctrine of 
uncertain breadth and probable prejudice to future technologies. 
4.  In the Supreme Court 
The combination of the circuit split and the high stakes prompted the Supreme 
Court to grant certiorari and hear the content industry‘s appeal.240  Eventually, it 
unanimously reversed the Ninth Circuit‘s decision to uphold summary judgment, 
introduced a third theory of secondary liability and strongly hinted that the 
defendants ought to be held liable under that newly minted doctrine on remand.241 
The likely reason for the Supreme Court‘s reliance on a third theory of 
secondary liability was that its members were unable to agree on what the staple 
article of commerce doctrine actually stood for, as publicly demonstrated by the 
decision‘s two conflicting concurrences.242  The compromise was that the Supreme 
Court preserved the Sony doctrine as a shield that may operate to protect a 
technology provider from contributory liability, but it was made clear that it does 
not preclude liability where there is an actual intention to induce the third party 
infringement.243  Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the Ninth Circuit had 
―misapplied Sony, which it read as limiting secondary liability quite beyond the 
circumstances to which the case applied.‖244 
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5.  It is Possible to Code Your Way Out of Vicarious and Contributory 
Infringement 
By deciding the case on inducement, the Supreme Court sidestepped some very 
difficult questions.  In its analysis the Ninth Circuit held that Sony is only relevant 
to contributory liability‘s knowledge element.245  Even if knowledge becomes 
easier to make out because Sony does not apply, that counts for nothing if 
contributory liability‘s second element is not made out.  The Supreme Court‘s 
vigorous debate over the scope and meaning of Sony masked the fact that the 
ingenious way in which the defendants coded their software convinced the Ninth 
Circuit that the contribution element could not be satisfied—a conclusion that lay 
undisturbed on appeal.246  Effectively then, the defendants achieved their aim of 
coding their way out of contributory liability. 
They apparently also succeeded in coding their way out of vicarious liability.  
The Supreme Court declined to consider whether the defendants were vicariously 
liable for their users‘ infringements and did not expressly disturb the Ninth 
Circuit‘s findings on this point.247  Accordingly, the Court left open the possibility 
that parties can escape vicarious liability by deliberately engineering their products 
to evade control.  Indeed, if anything, the Court actually increased the scope for 
future defendants to code their way out of vicarious liability.  It did so via the very 
definition it gave for liability under this doctrine—that one ―infringes vicariously 
by profiting from direct infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or 
limit it.‖248  Despite citing the classic case of Shapiro v. H.L. Green as authority for 
this test, the Supreme Court‘s formulation actually represents a significant shift 
away from previous strict liability formulations. Under those formulations, liability 
is imposed where the appropriate relationship exists, regardless of whether the 
defendant exercises all of the control that it has over the third party infringer.249  As 
Yen explains however, the Supreme Court‘s formulation ―allows the defendant to 
escape liability by exercising control . . . . No longer does a defendant face liability 
even if she exercises control.  To the contrary, she escapes liability if she exercises 
whatever control she has, even if she fails to stop the infringement.‖250  
This approach is consistent with that taken by the Ninth Circuit in Napster, but it 
diverges significantly from previous vicarious liability case law and indeed seems 
inconsistent with the origins and rationale for the doctrine. This formulation 
suggests that even a half-decade after P2P software developers had started 
exploiting the existing law‘s physical world assumptions, the Supreme Court still 
did not fully understand how the rules of the game had changed.  Unlike previous 
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physical world technologies, code-based distribution technologies have proved 
capable of being designed to eliminate or dramatically reduce the amount of control 
necessary whilst still facilitating enormous amounts of infringement.251  But, by 
redefining the vicarious liability doctrine to provide that there will be no liability 
where all possible control over the third party has been exercised, even if that fails 
to prevent the infringement, the Supreme Court apparently made it easier than ever 
for designers of P2P technologies to code their way out of vicarious liability.252 
Thus the defendants had avoided contributory liability because their software‘s 
architecture apparently prevented the contribution element from being satisfied, and 
they had avoided vicarious liability because its design made it impossible for them 
to have the requisite right and ability to supervise third party infringement.253  They 
had succeeded in coding their file sharing software in ways that fell outside of the 
existing U.S. secondary liability law.  Stymied by the fact that existing secondary 
liability principles seemed to provide no remedy against these obvious scofflaws, 
the Supreme Court created a new theory of liability with which to defeat them. 
6.  Inducement 
Just as in 1984, the Supreme Court looked to copyright‘s cousin, patent law, for 
inspiration.  Section 271(b) of Chapter 35 of the United States Code had long 
provided that ―whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as 
an infringer.‖254  The Supreme Court imported it wholesale, holding that ―one who 
distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as 
shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is 
liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.‖255  This was a 
compromise by a Court which believed that the defendants should not escape 
liability for their behavior—but which was irreconcilably split as to whether they 
should be liable under Sony. 
Officially, the Supreme Court remanded the matter to the district court to 
determine the defendants‘ liability under this new theory.  However, it strongly 
suggested that liability ought to attach.  Pointing to three ―particularly notable‖ 
indicia of intent, the Court unanimously declared the defendants‘ ―unlawful 
objective . . . unmistakable.‖256 
The first factor was that ―each [defendant] company showed itself to be aiming 
to satisfy a known source of demand for copyright infringement, the market 
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comprising former Napster users.‖257  In addition to advertising to Napster users 
(internal company documents made reference to Napster), Grokster appeared to 
have derived its name from Napster, and the defendants‘ software functioned 
similarly to Napster‘s.258  The Court concluded that the defendants‘ ―efforts to 
supply services to former Napster users, deprived of a mechanism to copy and 
distribute what were overwhelmingly infringing files, indicate a principal, if not 
exclusive, intent on the part of each to bring about infringement.‖259 
The second factor was the defendants‘ failure to develop filtering tools or other 
mechanisms that would reduce the amount of infringement that occurred through 
the use of their software.260  ―[W]e think this evidence underscores Grokster‘s and 
StreamCast‘s intentional facilitation of their users‘ infringement.‖261  In a footnote, 
the Court went on to say that without ―other evidence of intent, a court would be 
unable to find contributory infringement liability merely based on a failure to take 
affirmative steps to prevent infringement, if the device otherwise was capable of 
substantial noninfringing uses.  Such a holding would tread too close to the Sony 
safe harbor.‖262 
Third, the Court found it significant that the more the defendant technologies 
were used, the greater the advertising revenue earned by the defendants.263  Once 
again the Court qualified this factor:  ―This evidence alone would not justify an 
inference of unlawful intent, but viewed in the context of the entire record its 
import is clear.‖264  Thus it appears that the amount of revenue linked to 
infringement only becomes a relevant factor once there is some other evidence of 
bad intent.  That is, if the business has encouraged that infringement in some way 
and the business model is reliant on infringement, that reliance can be taken into 
account in determining whether or not there was inducement.  In this case there was 
evidence that the respondents‘ revenue was heavily reliant on infringement, with 
approximately ninety percent of all use infringing.  This factor was the most 
tenuous of the three.  Felten finds it ―hard to think of any conceivable business 
model for a software company under which an increase in use of the product does 
not lead to an increase in revenue.‖265  Zimmerman has pointed out that the 
defendants‘ being financially better off by virtue of their users‘ infringement would 
be the case to some degree with any dual use technology distributed by a profit-
making entity.  It would be surprising, for example, if Apple did not sell more iPods 
because some people value them as wonderful tools for the illicit downloading of 
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music, rather than merely as a way to download from legal channels.266 
Combined, these indicia caused Tim Wu to describe the decision as an example 
of the ―Miss Manners‘ School of Jurisprudence.‖267  In his opinion, it was the brash 
and blatant way in which the P2P defendants went about achieving their goals that 
led to their undoing: 
The P2P companies were loud scofflaws, foreigners, and college students who 
blatantly encouraged illegal acts.  KaZaA‘s successor by contrast, Apple‘s iTunes, 
may ultimately pose a greater threat to the recording industry, but it operates in a 
respectable way.  Steve Jobs is a rebel with manners.  And that has made all the 
difference.268 
Taking the Supreme Court‘s broad hint that it ought to be held liable on remand, 
Grokster Ltd. chose to settle the lawsuit shortly after the Supreme Court‘s 
inducement decision was handed down.269  StreamCast however elected to pursue 
the matter, and in September 2006, almost five years after the litigation 
commenced, summary judgment was finally entered against it on the basis that it 
had induced third party infringement.270 
While the creation of the inducement doctrine filled the law‘s Grokster shaped 
hole, the Court did not take the opportunity to consider more fundamentally what it 
was about software-based file sharing technologies that justified treating them 
differently from their predecessors.  As a result, the Supreme Court‘s new doctrine, 
like its predecessors, turned out to be based on a number of physical world 
assumptions that would turn out not to hold in the software context.  As will 
become apparent, the mismatch between that decision‘s assumptions and the 
realities of P2P development was the main cause of the subsequent explosion in the 
number and variety of P2P applications, and the inevitable abandonment of the 
secondary liability campaign against P2P software providers. 
IV.  HOW GROKSTER LED DIRECTLY TO MORE P2P PROVIDERS 
A.  BATTLES WON.  WAR LOST. 
By 2005, rights holders had litigated their way to a considerably stronger 
position vis-à-vis technology providers than when they had commenced the 
litigation campaign against P2P software providers in 1999.  But rather than 
pressing forward by ramping up the campaign, they chose instead to abruptly end 
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it.271 
In part, this can be attributed to the fact that most existing commercial operators 
had engaged in the same kind of bad-acting behavior as that which had supported 
the finding of inducement in Grokster and, seeing the writing on the wall, quickly 
negotiated settlements and exited the market.272  Lime Group LLC was the only 
major holdout in this category—and the last scalp claimed in the P2P litigation 
campaign:  the District Court engaged in a straightforward application of the 
inducement doctrine, and this time had no hesitation in granting summary judgment 
in the plaintiffs‘ favor.273 
But, this is not to say that P2P software development ceased after Grokster was 
handed down.  In fact, the opposite is true.  There was actually an explosion in the 
number of P2P file sharing programs available for users to download.  By 2007, 
two years after Grokster was handed down, online software repository SourceForge 
listed literally thousands of file sharing software projects, each presumably being 
developed by an individual or corporation undeterred by the decisions against their 
predecessors and competitors.274  Those programs were being put to enthusiastic 
use:  the BigChampagne media measurement company estimated that during that 
same year, 9.35 million individuals were simultaneously sharing files on P2P 
networks at any one time.275  The biggest challenge of all was coming from 
BitTorrent, a P2P distribution technology that was developed in 2002 by 
programmer Bram Cohen to facilitate the legitimate distribution of the enormous 
files favored by the jamband community.276  Inevitably, however, the technology‘s 
ability to facilitate the online distribution of very large files in an efficient manner 
also made it the tool of choice for unauthorized distribution of movies, games and 
TV.  As an unofficial online manual to the technology explains, ―[i]t was not 
designed as a haven for pirates and copyright violation, it just happens to be really 
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good for it.‖277  By 2007, BitTorrent usage was estimated to account for between 55 
and 75% of global Internet traffic, with more than 100 million installations claimed 
worldwide.278 
Popular websites host torrent files linking to a cornucopia of infringing movies, 
music, television shows and computer games, and display statistics suggesting that 
popular movies and TV shows are regularly downloaded thousands of times 
each.279  Although the ephemeral and disparate nature of BitTorrent networks 
makes it difficult to accurately gauge the overall proportion of infringing use, a 
University of Ballarat-affiliated Internet Commerce Security Laboratory study, 
involving a sample of 1000 torrent files, concluded that 89% were definitely 
infringing and only 0.3% were definitely noninfringing (the remainder of the 
sample comprised pornographic movies, which were not conclusively categorized 
one way or another).280  In total, 97.9% of all nonpornographic files were found to 
infringe copyright, and every one of the nonpornographic movies, music and TV 
shows was infringing.281  Although the methodology of this study has been 
questioned, it does give some statistical weight to what has long been apparent—
BitTorrent‘s infringing usage is extremely substantial.282 
So why was it that P2P software development exploded in the wake of the 
Grokster decision?  And why was it that, despite the huge level of infringement 
facilitated by those new file sharing programs, the litigation campaign against P2P 
software providers came to a halt so soon after that favorable judgment? 
B.  SOME SOFTWARE WORLD REALITIES 
Once again, the answer to those questions lies in mismatches between physical 
world assumptions and software world realities.  So far, this Article has focused 
largely on the first of the four physical world assumptions that were identified in 
Part I:  the idea that physical world rules apply to all.  That assumption manifested 
in a number of ways, including the development of secondary liability laws that 
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were premised on the idea that culpable defendants would have some kind of 
control over third party infringers.  When this assumption was shattered by the 
development of ever and more anarchic P2P distribution technologies, content 
interests agitated for laws that allowed for secondary liability to be imposed in the 
absence of control, culminating in the Supreme Court‘s decision in Grokster.283  In 
the months after those decisions were reached, however, it must have slowly 
dawned on the victors that even these new and broadened formulations were going 
to be of very little assistance in stamping out the continued development of P2P file 
sharing applications that facilitated a vast amount of infringement. 
In explaining why, the other three physical world assumptions that were 
introduced in Part I really came into play:  the ideas that distribution technologies 
capable of facilitating vast amounts of infringement are expensive to create, that 
their developers will be motivated by profit and that their creators will try to keep 
their secrets from competitors.  Each of these assumptions was premised on the 
idea that not just anyone could or would be able to create a technology capable of 
widespread copying or distribution.  While they held true, the gatekeeper 
enforcement model remained an effective means of controlling large scale 
infringement.  But this Part will demonstrate that those assumptions don‘t 
necessarily hold true in the software context—and that their inapplicability in the 
context of P2P file sharing software led directly and inevitably to the abandonment 
of the campaign against P2P software providers.  It does so by identifying some 
key software world realities, and demonstrating how they contrast with those 
physical world assumptions. 
1.  A Code-Based Distribution Technology Capable of Vast Amounts of 
Infringement Can Be Created Very Cheaply 
As explained in Part I, the creation of physical world distribution technologies 
capable of vast amounts of infringements—such as printing presses, photocopiers 
and VCRs—typically requires large investments in research, development and 
infrastructure.284  As Litman explains, U.S. copyright law ―was designed in an era 
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in which mass distribution of copies of works required a significant capital 
investment.‖285  Even if the initial invention of a physical world distribution 
technology is achieved cheaply—and history is filled with examples of hobbyist 
inventors on shoestring budgets making amazing breakthroughs—getting it to 
market inevitably still requires significant capital injections to finance further 
refinement of the technology, construction of a working prototype, mass-
manufacturing, packaging, compliance with regulatory requirements (such as 
electrical safety standards) and marketing and distribution of the resulting devices 
in each market.286  Such costs presented significant barriers to market entry, and led 
to secondary liability laws evolving on the assumption that there would be 
relatively few manufacturers of technologies that were capable of vast amounts of 
infringement. 
But we have seen throughout this Article that this assumption does not always 
hold true in the software context.  The brief history of P2P has demonstrated time 
after time that code-based distribution technologies can be unleashed from the 
minutest financial investments.  Napster was created by a teenager in response to an 
idle comment from his roommate; Gnutella was ―developed in just fourteen days 
by two guys without college degrees‖ and BitTorrent was invented by an 
unemployed programmer working from his dining room table.287  Indeed, the costs 
associated with creating file sharing programs are so low that some universities 
routinely require students to create them as part of their undergraduate computer 
science studies.288 
The cheapness and ease of P2P file sharing software development can be further 
illustrated by a sequence of events that began with Professor Edward Felten 
uploading what he claimed to be the world‘s smallest P2P file sharing application 
to his website in 2004.289  Utilizing just fifteen lines of software code, the purpose 
of the exercise was to illustrate the ease of creation and thus ―the difficulty of 
regulating peer-to-peer applications.‖290  But that point was made even more 
emphatically than Felten had intended:  as news of his feat spread, so too did an 
implied challenge to create one that was even smaller.  Within just 24 hours, the 
source code for a number of even tinier alternatives began to mushroom online, 
with the effort eventually culminating in at least one challenger writing a P2P file 
sharing application using just six lines of code.291 
Not only is it possible for the initial development costs of software-based 
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distribution technologies to be low, but the manufacture and distribution of 
software-based distribution technologies can also be virtually costless.  The 
marginal cost of creating additional copies of the prototype software approximates 
zero.292  While there can be costs associated with hosting a website to distribute 
software, these can be easily avoided since a number of sites (such as SourceForge) 
will host and distribute software free of charge.293  Alternatively, a developer could 
outsource its distribution costs to users by disseminating its software using a P2P 
protocol such as BitTorrent.  Any of these virtually cost-free online distribution 
methods allows the finished product to hit the global market within minutes, and if 
the software is useful and fills a niche, there is no need for expensive marketing.  
Word of mouth across the online file sharing community can do the rest. 
2.  Developers Aren’t Necessarily Motivated by Profit 
The second physical world assumption follows closely from the first.  If 
developing a distribution technology capable of facilitating vast amounts of 
infringement requires a substantial investment, it follows that its provider will want 
to extract a profit or at least recoup its costs.  The resulting link between financial 
benefit and liability for the copyright infringements of third parties is strong.  The 
most obvious manifestation of this assumption is in the financial element of 
vicarious infringement, but it has sometimes even influenced contributory 
infringement analyses.294  Likewise, the Supreme Court‘s inducement analysis was 
heavily influenced by the defendants‘ infringement-reliant business model.295 
In the physical world context, using actual or intended infringement related 
profit-making as an indicia of liability makes a lot of sense.  As Ganley explains, in 
that paradigm: 
The normal phases of R&D, product design, manufacture, unit testing and distribution 
all help to constrain the wilder excesses of copyright infringing potential.  The 
inherent checks and balances in the structure of legitimate businesses help to ensure 
that companies will shy away from such costly and time consuming exercises if they 
believe there is no legitimate avenue for them to recoup their substantial 
investment.296 
This assumption that distribution technology providers will want to profit from 
their inventions can certainly be supported in the software context, as was amply 
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demonstrated by the providers of Napster, Aimster, Grokster, Morpheus and Kazaa.  
However, the fact that a code-based distribution technology can be created, refined, 
marketed and distributed globally with relatively little investment of time or money 
means that development projects do not necessarily have to be driven by the 
prospect of financial advantage.  As Zittrain explains, ―[b]efore the advent of 
modems and networks, major physical-world infringers typically needed a business 
model because mass-scale copyright infringements required substantial investment 
in copying and distribution infrastructure.  With the advent of the Net, large scale 
infringements became possible through the sum of minor favors among friends and 
strangers.‖297 
While this is not to say that the developers of such projects would not be happy 
to turn a profit, it means that they have unprecedented scope to create projects that 
are not primarily driven by the need or the desire to do so.  When Felten‘s disciples 
spent a frenzied week working to better his fifteen line P2P app, it is doubtful that 
they had any thought or expectation that financial reward would flow from that 
work.  No prize or reward was offered by Felten. Instead the challengers appear to 
have been motivated by less tangible rewards, such as the satisfaction of solving a 
tricky intellectual puzzle, the enjoyment that comes from publicly one-upping a 
celebrated Princeton professor and perhaps even the expectation of some brief 
worship from the online peanut gallery.  Those individuals only worked on their 
projects for a few days, but this willingness to work on hobby projects without the 
motivation of financial gain can extend indefinitely. 
An inkling of the extent to which this development model exists can be gleaned 
from the SourceForge open source software repository, which hosts a vast number 
of P2P projects that apparently have no revenue model at all, including a number 
which have been under continuing development for a number of years.  Some of 
these projects include ANts P2P, a single-developer project that creates an 
anonymous P2P network; MUTE, which creates a file sharing network designed to 
protect end user privacy, and Gtk-Gnutella, a Gnutella client intended for use on 
Unix operating systems.298  This willingness to create innovative and sophisticated 
distribution technologies purely for the challenge, satisfaction and reputation that 
come from creating something really cool has been replicated many times over.  
The secrecy with which Frankel and Pepper developed Gnutella suggests they 
knew AOL would never sanction its continued development once the cat was out of 
the bag, but they created it anyway.299  Even Bram Cohen, creator of the 
revolutionary BitTorrent distribution technology, never actually intended to 
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commercialize it.300  Once it was finished ―he was ready to move on to something 
new,‖ and only built it into a company because of some arm-twisting by his 
father.301 
Of course, as Wu has pointed out in a different context, ―the human urge to 
speak, create, build things, and otherwise express oneself for its own sake, without 
expectation of financial reward, is hardly new.‖302  After all, there have been 
hobbyists and inventors throughout history who have made amazing breakthroughs 
without any financial incentive at all.303  There is however a vital difference 
between this willingness of physical world inventors and that of their software 
world equivalents.  An inventor of a physical world distribution technology might 
be able to make the technological breakthrough on a shoestring budget, but as 
described above there are significant and unavoidable costs associated with the 
development of any physical world distribution technology to bring it to the point 
where it‘s capable of facilitating any large amount of infringement that exist 
regardless of the inventor‘s willingness to work for free.  By contrast, a P2P 
programmer can potentially create a distribution technology, get it to market and 
distribute it globally for an unprecedentedly small amount of cash. 
3.  Tell Everyone How it Works—Maybe They Can Help Improve It 
The third assumption relevant to explaining the explosion in post-Grokster P2P 
development follows naturally from those discussed above.  Assume that 
researching, developing, manufacturing and distributing a technology that is 
capable of widespread infringement will be expensive, and thus there is a need to 
make some profit or recoup those costs.  From that perspective, it is unthinkable 
that someone might create a new kind of technology capable of revolutionizing the 
way content is distributed, and then freely give away that idea (and detailed 
instructions for implementing it) to others. 
It is not unusual for software developers to similarly lock away their secrets.304  
But there are also strong norms in the software development community that 
promote sharing them with the world.305  Software‘s secrets are contained in 
something known as source code, the human-readable instructions written by the 
programmer in a particular programming language.306  In order to operate on a 
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computer, source code must be compiled into machine-readable object code.307  
Once this conversion takes place, it is almost always no longer comprehensible to 
humans.308  This means that, unless a separate copy of the original source code is 
provided with the software, it is possible to ascertain what a software program does 
(for example, by observing network outputs and outcomes), but not precisely how 
it does it.  Where the source code is provided, the program is referred to as being 
―open source,‖ otherwise it is known as ―closed source‖ or ―proprietary‖ code.309  
However, being truly ―open source‖ means more than just making the source code 
available.  The most widely accepted definition of the concept, coined by the Open 
Source Initiative organization, also requires, among other things, that the terms of 
the software‘s license allow for that software to be freely redistributed, for 
―modifications and derived works‖ to be developed and for those modified versions 
to be able to be distributed under the same terms as the original.310 
The P2P secondary liability cases decided to date have almost exclusively 
involved large scale commercial P2P operators, which overwhelmingly favored 
closed source code.  Napster, Kazaa, Grokster and Morpheus (until it was locked 
out of the FastTrack network) were all closed source.311  Gnutella was the earliest 
open source pioneer to achieve widespread popularity.  Those in control of its code 
willingly released it for free to the general public, permitting it to be altered by 
strangers as they saw fit.312  This willingness to give away a technology‘s secrets is 
far from being an isolated case. 
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As noted in Section A above, software repository SourceForge was hosting 
literally thousands of open source file sharing projects two years after Grokster was 
handed down.313  For a long time BitTorrent was also open source.  When Cohen 
released his technology, he made its underlying source code widely available and 
provided a general license allowing third parties to further develop and distribute 
the software.314  The protocol documentation, specifying the requirements 
necessary to creating a compatible client, was also made available online.315  While 
each of the official BitTorrent clients released after August 2007 was closed source, 
the source code of all previous iterations and the protocol itself remain fully 
documented and ―publicly accessible without the need for a license.‖316  As a 
result, any person with the requisite programming skill can code his or her own 
BitTorrent client, and thousands of individuals and organizations have done so to 
date.317  Such independently created BitTorrent clients can be of excellent quality—
indeed, BitTorrent Inc. found the µTorrent client to be such a beautifully executed 
implementation of the protocol that it ended up purchasing it, then adopting a 
rebranded version as its official client in 2006.318  This occasional willingness of 
programmers to freely share the secrets that underlie their inventions is yet another 
vital and under-recognized distinction between the development of code-based and 
physical distribution technologies. 
C.  BITTORRENT & THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MISMATCH 
With reference to the BitTorrent distribution system, the following pages 
explain the practical significance of the mismatch between the post Grokster law‘s 
physical world assumptions and the software world‘s realities, and why it led 
directly to the abandonment of the secondary liability campaign against P2P 
software providers.319 
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1.  How BitTorrent Works 
―BitTorrent‖ refers to a number of distinct concepts.  The BitTorrent protocol 
dictates the technology‘s operation.  BitTorrent clients implement that protocol.  
Since the technology was open source for the first years of its existence, there are a 
huge number of such clients.320  Several have been provided by BitTorrent Inc. (the 
company created by its inventor to commercialize the technology), but mostly 
they‘ve been made available by independent third parties.  It has even entered the 
vernacular as a verb—to the dismay of content interests—individuals who miss 
episodes of their favorite TV shows may well announce an intention to 
―BitTorrent‖ them.321 
The BitTorrent distribution process is a lot like a jigsaw puzzle.  Users seek to 
obtain parts of the puzzle from any number of others, and then they piece it 
together into a coherent whole once they‘re all gathered.  The process begins when 
the holder of a piece of content uses a BitTorrent client to divide it into a number of 
much smaller pieces and to create an associated ―torrent‖ file.322  The torrent file 
contains metadata about the piece of content (such as the number of pieces into 
which it was divided, and the order in which they should be pieced back together), 
but not the content itself.323  Torrent files are then commonly made available via 
the World Wide Web.324  Any Web server is sufficient, but hosts commonly upload 
their torrents to one of a number of specialized torrent hosting websites in order to 
make them more easily locatable.325 Some such sites, most notably Sweden‘s 
infamous Pirate Bay, are clearly designed to facilitate access to infringing 
content.326  Unlike Napster, Kazaa, Morpheus and so on, BitTorrent clients 
typically have no integrated search functionality.327  Instead, individuals must 
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independently find a torrent associated with desired content, which they may do via 
dedicated torrent search engines, by browsing torrent hosting sites, or simply by 
adding ―filetype:torrent‖ to any Google search.328  They might also use BitTorrent 
Inc.‘s own torrent search engine, which was added to its website in May 2005.329  
That facility, which is completely independent of the BitTorrent software and 
protocol, ―crawls‖ the World Wide Web for torrent files to create an index, from 
which it provides users with responses to their search queries.330 
Once a torrent file has been obtained, BitTorrent client software uses the 
information within it to facilitate the distribution of the desired content amongst 
users.331  Users transferring content via BitTorrent are categorized as either ―seeds‖ 
or ―leechers.‖332  Seeds are users who continue uploading pieces of a resource to 
others, despite themselves already having a complete copy.333  The first seed will 
often be the host user who originally created and published the torrent file, but it 
can be any user who has a complete copy of the resource that matches the metadata 
in the torrent file.  Leechers are users that are attempting to obtain all or part of the 
file.334  Collectively, a group of seeds and leechers is known as a ―swarm.‖ 335 
It is important to understand that unlike Napster, Gnutella and FastTrack, 
BitTorrent does not facilitate the creation of a single vast network to which every 
BitTorrent user connects.  Instead, each swarm effectively comprises a discrete 
peer network devoted exclusively to distributing a resource associated with a 
particular torrent.336  Communications within the swarm are traditionally facilitated 
by a tracker or trackers, which are BitTorrent‘s equivalent to Napster‘s central 
servers and FastTrack‘s supernodes.337  Their role is to maintain information about 
the users distributing a particular resource, including their IP addresses and a record 
of those pieces they already have and those they are yet to obtain.338  Using that 
information, trackers effectively act as a ―rendezvous point‖ for those involved in 
distributing the resource associated with a particular torrent.339 
When the BitTorrent protocol was first formulated, trackers represented the 
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most vulnerable point in the distribution process.340  Their failure due to technical 
or legal difficulties had been observed to cause severe interruptions to the 
downloading of infringing torrents.341  However, an extension to the protocol was 
subsequently developed that now enables files to be distributed without the 
assistance of a tracker, using Distributed Hash Tables or DHT.342  Commonly 
referred to as ―trackerless torrenting,‖ DHT enlists peers to perform the tracker‘s 
traditional functions through the creation of a separate decentralized P2P network 
to which most modern BitTorrent clients now connect by default.343  An additional 
technology known as Peer Exchange or PEX can be used to further reduce the load 
on the tracker or DHT system by allowing for individual peers to subsequently 
share the locations of others amongst themselves.344  These technologies have been 
so successful in reducing reliance on centralized trackers that the Pirate Bay 
switched its tracking server off in 2009, explaining that the maturation of DHT and 
PEX meant that there was no longer any need for it.345  ―This is what we consider 
to be the future.  Faster and more stability for the users because there is no central 
point to rely upon.‖346 
Unlike most distribution systems, BitTorrent‘s performance actually improves 
as more users try to simultaneously download a particular piece of content.347  
That‘s because once a leecher has obtained a piece of the resource from one source, 
it begins uploading or sending it to other users while it simultaneously downloads 
new ones.348  By spreading the distribution across all users, rather than 
concentrating it on the few that have the entire copy, popular content can be 
distributed very widely, very fast.  When highly popular files are released via 
BitTorrent, thousands or even tens of thousands of peers have been known to join 
swarms within hours.349  The system is also extremely efficient.  Cohen designed it 
with a ―tit-for-tat‖ algorithm to encourage peers to put their upload allocation to 
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best use, and thus to achieve Pareto efficiency.350  In the event that a particular peer 
does not reciprocate by sending data upstream in exchange for downloaded pieces, 
they can find themselves at the bottom of the priority list for the next piece of the 
file.351  Another clever element of the BitTorrent distribution process is the 
protocol‘s policy of ―rarest first.‖352  If pieces of the resource were distributed 
randomly, it is more likely that a situation will arise where nobody in the swarm 
has one or more necessary pieces.  However, the protocol enables peers to 
automatically request the rarest pieces first, thereby maximizing the life of the 
swarm.353  Still, swarms inevitably die out as peers stop sharing a particular 
resource or simply go offline.  Leechers who are stranded with only part of the file 
when this occurs may never be able to complete their download. 
2.  Contributory and Vicarious Liability Ruled Out by BitTorrent’s Design 
If BitTorrent Inc. or any other BitTorrent client provider were sued for the 
infringements of their users, it is unlikely they would be liable under existing 
formulations of contributory or vicarious infringement.  Although the BitTorrent 
distribution process has two points of centralization—the trackers and torrent 
hosting websites—the system is designed in such a way that providers of 
BitTorrent software need not have control over either.  That is, the trackers and 
torrent hosting websites can be (and usually are) completely independent of the 
software providers.354  Additionally, the system incorporates no internal search 
functionality, and creates no single network like that of Napster, Grokster and 
Sharman‘s technologies.355  These design features combine to ensure that no 
BitTorrent software provider could be liable for its users‘ infringements under the 
existing contributory or vicarious liability law.  Here‘s why. 
To start, any contributory liability analysis would be partly shaped by whether 
the technology was accepted as being capable of substantial noninfringing uses.  
This is likely to be controversial because its legitimate usages are significantly 
outweighed by those that are infringing—making it fall into a category of products 
for which the Supreme Court was unable to agree on the proper treatment.356  It 
would, however, be relevant to the analysis that the technology‘s current legitimate 
uses are varied and growing, and include the distribution of the enormously popular 
World of Warcraft computer game, independent films, Linux operating systems 
and even data published by NASA.357 
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Increasingly, it is also used to streamline data distribution within enterprise.  For 
example, after adopting BitTorrent technology for rolling out software to its 
thousands of servers, Facebook became able to send updates hundreds of 
megabytes in size to tens of thousands of machines in a single minute—a process 
that could take hours via more traditional distribution technologies.358  Engineers at 
Twitter similarly managed to use BitTorrent to reduce the time it took to deploy 
code across its servers from forty minutes to a mere twelve seconds.359  Its 
efficiencies are such that even high profile content owners like Warner Brothers, 
Twentieth Century Fox and MTV have at various times gotten onboard the 
BitTorrent bandwagon.360  If Sony does apply, the consequence is that contributory 
liability can only be made out if BitTorrent Inc. has sufficient actual knowledge of 
third party infringement.  The Ninth Circuit in Grokster held that, to satisfy this 
element, actual knowledge must be held at a time that the defendant was 
contributing to the third party infringement or could do something to stop it.361  
This is something that no BitTorrent software provider could satisfy, since the 
design of their software means that third party infringement is always outside their 
control. 
However, the issue of whether Sony applies is something of a red herring.  That 
is because, even if the knowledge element could be satisfied, BitTorrent providers 
do not appear to have relevantly contributed to the third party infringement.  In 
accordance with the Ninth Circuit‘s reasoning in Grokster (which was undisturbed 
by the Supreme Court on appeal), the creation of software that facilitates 
connection to independent networks without any need for assistance or intervention 
from the defendants is not a sufficiently ―material‖ contribution to any resulting 
infringement.362  Vicarious liability is also ruled out by the technology‘s design.  
Even if the defendants were found to have the requisite financial interest in the 
third party infringement, they nonetheless have no right and ability to supervise that 
infringement within the meaning of the existing law, and thus could not be held 
vicariously liable for it. 
One of the most interesting aspects of BitTorrent‘s design is the way in which it 
disproves the belief that efficiency and liability resistance are mutually exclusive.  
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The evolution of Gnutella and Kazaa suggested that departing from Napster‘s 
centralized P2P model to eliminate liability-attracting control would result in less 
efficient ways of distributing content.  As Wu stated in 2003: 
The design of P2P applications to avoid copyright presents a technical challenge with 
implications not fully appreciated by legal scholarship.  The technical study of P2P 
design shows that designing a P2P filesharing network to avoid copyright requires 
important deviations from the optimal design for speed, control, and usability.  The 
programmers of a copyright-resistant P2P network must balance an interest in 
avoiding legal liability against the competing interests of ensuring performance on a 
mass scale, maintaining system stability, and fostering network trust.  These matters 
all require control over the network, while a pure peer design eliminates control as 
much as possible.363 
Thus, it was assumed that a P2P software provider could not design an optimally 
efficient distribution system without having a liability-attracting degree of control 
over it.  If it did have control, it could be liable under the doctrines of contributory 
or vicarious infringement.  With BitTorrent, however, which was actually released 
before Wu‘s article even made it to print, Cohen proved that it was possible to code 
a P2P distribution technology that achieves a high degree of efficiency even though 
the software provider has no control whatsoever over any of the networks formed 
when individuals attempt to distribute a piece of content.  BitTorrent certainly has 
centralized points—in the form of trackers and torrent hosting and indexing sites—
which help achieve these aims, but (by design) they can and do exist completely 
independently of BitTorrent software providers.364  The result is a technology that, 
contrary to all accepted wisdom, facilitates the fast, efficient and effortless transfer 
of data, and does so in a way that is powerfully protective of its provider‘s liability. 
3.  Inducement 
Since the technology‘s design seemingly rules out BitTorrent software providers 
from being liable under existing control-based formulations of contributory and 
vicarious liability, rights holders would be obliged to rely on inducement.  
Inducement focuses on the individual defendant‘s conduct and intent, and is not 
automatically ruled out by a defendant‘s lack of immediate control over the third 
party infringement.365 
Has BitTorrent Inc. ―distributed a device with the object of promoting its use to 
infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to 
foster infringement?‖366  In large part, the answer to this question depends on the 
interpretation given to this newly-minted doctrine.  If an interpretation is adopted 
that requires some active step being taken to promote infringement, it is unlikely 
that BitTorrent Inc. would be liable.  The public record does not disclose any 
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evidence of bad intent similar to that which justified the finding of liability against 
the providers of the Grokster, Morpheus or LimeWire technologies.  To the 
contrary, BitTorrent Inc has consistently promoted its software as a useful tool for 
efficient legitimate content distribution, and has gone to some lengths to ensure that 
its own search engine does not return links to torrents associated with infringing 
content.367  Ginsburg has argued that ―the most probative Grokster element‖ is the 
promotion of the availability of infringing content—something that is certainly 
absent on these facts.368  Furthermore, the technology is actually designed in a way 
that makes it easy for rights holders to identify direct infringers, a fact that led 
Cohen to describe those who put it to infringing use as ―patently stupid.‖369  As 
Felten puts it, BitTorrent‘s creator ―seems interested only in noninfringing uses, 
and has said all the right things about infringement—so consistently that one can 
only conclude he is sincere.‖370 
But that is not to say that BitTorrent Inc. could not be found liable for 
inducement.  The doctrine‘s real life application would be largely dependent on 
information that could only come to light after an exhaustive discovery process.  It 
is quite possible that some smoking gun would be discovered supporting a finding 
of liability.  Even in its absence, BitTorrent Inc. could still be held liable if rights 
holders were able to persuade courts to adopt a broad interpretation of inducement.  
For example, Ginsburg and Ricketson have suggested that the very prevalence of 
infringement facilitated by a particular technology may itself be evidence of 
intent.371  If such a standard were to be adopted, a court may indeed find that 
BitTorrent Inc. has the requisite intent to induce infringement by virtue of its 
overwhelming number of infringing uses.  In that case some other circumstances 
might be relevant in supporting that finding.  For example, a technology called 
FurthurNet was launched a year before BitTorrent, and was also designed to 
facilitate sharing of jamband music.372  Despite the unusually strong anti-
infringement norms predominant in the jamband community, copyright 
infringement remains an ongoing problem.  With that in mind, FurthurNet was 
designed to implement strict filtering protocols that limit distribution to those 
recordings and musicians who have agreed to permit it.373 
The fact that such technology was released to a similar market at an earlier time 
may suggest that, by failing to include similar filtering technology in BitTorrent, 
Cohen intended it to be used for infringement.  It may also be relevant that Cohen 
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created his software in a post-Napster, post-Kazaa world.  Having experienced the 
phenomenon of those distribution technologies attracting millions of users and 
publicly facilitating billions of infringements, it must have been clear to him that it 
was that infringement that truly drove the ―success‖ of the companies behind these 
technologies.  These circumstances suggest that if Cohen wanted his technology to 
be a success, he wanted people to use it for infringement, and that might potentially 
be seen as evidence of intent.  Thus, it‘s certainly possible that BitTorrent Inc. and 
its founder might be held liable for inducement. 
4.  So Why Haven’t Content Interests Sued? 
The above sketch demonstrates that, whilst the design of the BitTorrent 
technology appears to automatically rule out contributory and vicarious liability, it 
is at least arguable that a BitTorrent software provider such as BitTorrent Inc. could 
have been held liable for inducement.  Even though liability is not clear cut, in light 
of the amount of infringement facilitated by BitTorrent and the past pattern of 
success against P2P providers in similar circumstances, content interests might 
have been expected to pursue an expansionist litigation strategy, hopeful of finding 
some smoking gun that might persuade a court to find liability.  But they have not 
done so.  Not a single BitTorrent software provider has ever been sued for the 
infringements of its users.  The underlying reasons for that omission are the key to 
the industry‘s abandonment of the secondary liability campaign against P2P 
software providers, and this is where the mismatch between physical world 
assumptions and software world realities again comes into play. 
All three of the physical world assumptions identified above are premised on the 
idea that that not just anyone could or would be able to create a technology capable 
of widespread copying or distribution.  As discussed throughout this Article, for a 
long time it was universally true that it was expensive to develop a distribution 
technology capable of facilitating widespread infringement from inception to 
market, that the individuals involved were thus looking to make a profit or at least 
recoup their costs and that they were not keen to give away their technology‘s 
secrets.  Each of these realities of physical world manufacturing contributed to 
keeping the number of market entrants relatively few.  Combined, as noted above, 
they made the gatekeeper enforcement model an effective means of controlling 
large scale infringement.  The universality of these assumptions may have been 
reinforced by the fact that they can and indeed often do hold in the software 
context—just think of the business models of Microsoft, Adobe and Apple.  But, as 
BitTorrent demonstrates, they can and have been dramatically diverted from, with 
significant, though under-recognized, consequences. 
It is now well recognized that existing secondary liability doctrines are premised 
on the idea that there is a limited number of gatekeepers that can be utilized to deter 
end user infringement, and that gatekeeper liability regimes work less well in the 
era of code-based distribution technologies where tens of millions of individuals 
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have the ability to quickly and cheaply make perfect copies.374  Wu has 
compellingly argued that developers of code-based P2P file sharing technologies 
have exploited this weakness of the gatekeeper structure by eliminating 
intermediaries in order to avoid copyright‘s traditional enforcement measures.375  
However, there is an additional nuance that needs to be recognized:  the difference 
in the efficacy of gatekeeper enforcement regimes when applied to open source 
versus closed source technologies.  Gatekeeper enforcement regimes undeniably 
work less well in circumstances where the ability to make perfect copies is in the 
hands of many.  But they work considerably less well still when the ability to create 
the tools necessary to make those copies becomes widely dispersed. 
Consider a proprietary P2P protocol like FastTrack, as implemented by Kazaa 
and other licensed clients.  That technology‘s source code was always very tightly 
guarded by its various owners.376  Although at one point it was licensed to Grokster 
Ltd. and StreamCast Networks Inc., Sharman retained the ability to lock them out 
of its network, and they did not have access to its source code.377  The decentralized 
nature of the technology meant that existing FastTrack clients could not be forced 
out of circulation.  However, a finding of liability can have some impact even in a 
situation involving a technology that cannot be ―switched off.‖  For example, its 
owners could certainly take measures to make it a less attractive tool for 
committing infringement, by effectively forcing upgrades upon its users (and 
incorporating filtering technologies into the new versions), and by ceasing 
development and support of the software.378  Even if the technical design of the 
software prevents forced upgrades, the cessation of development would soon result 
in its becoming outdated and incompatible with the latest operating systems, 
resulting in abandonment by some and then most of its users, and inevitably 
reducing the amount of infringement facilitated by that software.  Indeed that is 
effectively what transpired after FastTrack‘s operators settled with content interests 
in 2006.379  A study of P2P traffic conducted by a German Internet traffic 
management and analysis organization in late 2006 found that FastTrack had ―all 
but ceased to exist‖ in that market, with its share of the P2P market estimated at 
just 0.06%.380 
Contrast this with an open source technology like BitTorrent.  By releasing the 
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protocol document and source code of his original client, Cohen put the power to 
create programs capable of facilitating vast amounts of infringement into the hands 
of an unlimited number of developers.  Because of the negligible investment 
needed to follow those instructions and create a compatible client, many have taken 
up the implied invitation and done so—SourceForge alone typically hosts well over 
a hundred BitTorrent clients on its site, and almost four hundred BitTorrent related 
software projects in total, and there are scores more to be found elsewhere on the 
Internet.381  Those clients are invulnerable to threats of vicarious and contributory 
liability because the technology does not give them the control over third party 
infringement that various physical world assumptions led the law to require.  The 
potential liability of their providers is further limited by the fact that they have a 
relatively sophisticated understanding of the kind of behavior that will render them 
liable under other doctrines, and because the low development costs and intangible 
rewards from creating their own application mean they do not necessarily have the 
infringing business model that was so crucial to liability in Grokster.382  As a result, 
they are unlikely to be liable for inducement or authorization. 
To tease out the implications of a finding of liability, however, assume that 
some incriminating evidence led to a BitTorrent software provider being held liable 
for inducement or authorization.  When a similar finding was made against the 
closed source FastTrack technology, it rapidly brought about its virtual 
disappearance from the marketplace.383  But even if such evidence of intent against 
one BitTorrent developer led to its being held liable for inducement or 
authorization, it does not follow that BitTorrent technology generally would be 
similarly removed.  Although a court might order a specific developer to stop 
distributing, developing and supporting its own particular client, it could and would 
do nothing to prevent new implementations of precisely the same technology from 
appearing and filling the gap.  And since authorization and inducement attach to 
culpable behavior rather than anything inherent to the technology itself, a finding of 
liability would do nothing to prevent other BitTorrent developers from continuing 
support and development of their own virtually identical implementations of the 
same technology.384 
This is ultimately why content interests abandoned their litigation campaign 
against P2P software providers.  It was not because there were no providers left, or 
because P2P file sharing had stopped being of great concern to rights holders.  It 
was because they realized that, even if they managed to successfully sue a company 
such as BitTorrent Inc., it would have had no real impact on the amount of third 
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party infringement facilitated by the BitTorrent file sharing technology in general.  
This was an inevitable consequence of a combination of a number of software 
world realities, particularly Cohen‘s willingness to share the technology‘s secrets in 
the first place, but also the low development costs and associated lack of imperative 
to profit from resulting infringement enjoyed by later comers.  In those 
circumstances, the gatekeeper enforcement regimes of the U.S. and Australian 
copyright laws were of little utility, and further litigation was clearly useless.  This 
might have been the type of situation that Lessig was hinting at, albeit in a slightly 
different context, when he argued that open code is harder to regulate than 
closed.385  After all, gatekeepers aren‘t much help when they‘re the one punching 
the holes in the wall. 
V.  CONCLUSIONS:  SERIOUS AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
The P2P cases decided over the last decade have had three main outcomes.  
Firstly, they resulted in large scale commercial P2P operators being almost entirely 
forced out of the market, although in the case of some—like Kazaa and 
LimeWire—this occurred so slowly that their technologies had already been 
superseded and most profits extracted before the death knell sounded.  Secondly, 
they brought about the corresponding proliferation of independent, legally 
sophisticated operators whose software facilitates precisely the same result, but in a 
manner that is unlikely to render them liable under existing law.  Finally, they led 
to the quiet abandonment of the litigation campaign against P2P providers in favor 
of targets higher up the food chain, including the ISPs who control access to the 
Internet and even the fabric of the Internet itself. 
In the U.S., these measures have included negotiating partnerships with 
individual ISPs to assist with enforcement against end users, lobbying for increased 
legal obligations to filter for infringing content, and seeking the introduction of 
controversial government powers that would allow the Federal Attorney General to 
seize and block domain names associated with infringing content.386  In Australia, 
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rights holders took advantage of the broad scope of the authorization doctrine (and 
the narrowness of the complementary safe harbor) by suing an ISP for authorizing 
its users‘ infringements, possibly with the aim of pressuring Australian ISPs to 
agree to a general code of conduct addressing responses to copyright 
infringement.387  That matter is still making its way through the appeal process.388  
Globally they have included lobbying for the introduction of ―graduated response‖ 
or ―three strikes‖ laws in a number of jurisdictions, as well as (unsuccessfully) 
seeking their inclusion in the recently finalized international Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement (ACTA).389 
These outcomes have all been driven by the secondary liability law‘s 
susceptibility to exploitation of the physical world/software world divide, and its 
continued inability to recognize and respond to the ways in which P2P file sharing 
software differs from predecessor distribution technologies.  That inability is not 
altogether surprising given that the P2P cases decided to date have involved 
litigants that, thanks to their largely closed source code and infringement reliant 
business models, positively reinforced those assumptions.  As has been seen, 
however, the realities of P2P software development can be very different from 
those of their physical world counterparts, and the failure to take those realities into 
account in determining legal responses has had serious and unintended 
consequences. 
In response to Grokster, Zittrain predicted in 2006 that the existence ―of 
software authors willing to code and release file sharing software without any 
business model at all‖ would mean that P2P distribution software ―w[ould] 
continue to exist even if it c[ould not] be marketed formally, much less marketed as 
a pirate‘s tool.‖390  That is precisely what has occurred.  The shakeout of 
commercially oriented P2P software providers demonstrated the success of the 
Supreme Court‘s inducement framework in removing commercial enterprises 
whose business models relied on infringement.  At the same time, however, there 
has been exponential growth of small noncommercial providers that have no 
infringing business model (or indeed any business model at all), but that have put 
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out software that is just as capable of facilitating infringement as that of their 
predecessors.391  Since there is no need for substantial investment, there is no need 
to recoup that investment, and as a consequence, those ―checks and balances‖ 
inherent to physical world development can be almost entirely absent.392  This is 
the reality of current P2P software development, which is simply not recognized by 
the existing law—even by those principles that were specifically crafted in 
response to P2P technologies. 
Legal scholarship has touched upon the distinctions between software worlds 
and physical worlds in several different contexts, particularly in considering 
whether and how computer software should be provided with patent and copyright 
law protection, and while considering the jurisdictional and choice of law 
difficulties associated with enforcing laws in cyberspace.393  However, their 
implications remain poorly understood.  It is not surprising that we are slow to 
acknowledge the revolutionary properties of code.  As Katsh explains, new 
technologies have historically been ―perceived not as something with unique 
characteristics that will create new institutions and change old ones, but rather as 
something that simply extends the capabilities of . . . existing technolog[ies].‖394  
Thus ―early films were labeled ‗moving pictures‘ and were not immediately 
understood to be a new art form,‖ ―the first cars were called ‗horseless carriages‘ 
and looked as though they were designed to be pulled by a horse,‖ and early 
personal computers ―were called ‗typewriters with memory.‘‖395  As Katsh 
explains, the danger of equating unlike technologies is that it may ―mask the 
revolutionary character of the new technology.‖396  In turn, this can lead to legal 
standards that miss their targets because they fail to take into account the properties 
of the new innovation that make them unique.  As this Article has demonstrated, 
that is exactly what has occurred with regard to P2P file sharing software. 
This Article has told the story of the beginning of the P2P file sharing era, 
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tracing the way in which the law and technology evolved in response to efforts by 
rights holders to end the resulting infringement, and explaining how, after a decade 
of ostensibly successful litigation, there came to be more P2P file sharing software 
providers than ever before.  It unmasked the revolutionary nature of software code, 
and highlighted how the physical world assumptions on which the existing law is 
based cripple its ability to respond to the P2P phenomenon.  My recently published 
book, Code Wars: 10 Years of P2P Software Litigation, more completely 
chronicles the history of the P2P file sharing litigation era, and goes on to ask 
whether the secondary liability law can be reformulated in a way that better 
responds to the challenges posed by code-based distribution technologies.
397
  If 
you‘re interested in continuing the story, please refer to the book. 
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